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I. Introduction
The Hudson River estuary is one of the richest ecosys-
tems on Earth. Millions of fish spawn there every year- in a
tidal system that extends from New York Harbor to the Troy
locks, a distance of some 150 miles. Although neglected until
recently, the river's ecological health is now protected under
an array of federal and state laws.
2
The river has been a source for drinking water,3 fisher-
ies, commercial navigation, and recreation. The river has
also served as a convenient and inexpensive route for the rail-
roads which were constructed along its shores in the mid to
late 1800s.
This article considers the legal principles governing the
state's and the railroads' obligation to provide river access,
the factors threatening existing access, and militating
against improved access. 4 After considering the problem, this
article recommends the codification of certain legal principles
to protect and improve access to the tidal Hudson River.
1. See ROBERT H. BOYLE, THE HUDSON RIVER: A NATURAL AND UNNATURAL
HISTORY 22, 131 (1979).
2. See The Hudson River Estuary Management Program, N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAw § 11-0306 (McKinney Supp. 1995). Most of the river and shore-
line has been designated a critical environmental area under the State Environ-
mental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) regulations of the New York Department
of Environmental Conservation (DEC), providing additional scrutiny of state
agency actions, and agency actions of political subdivisions of the state, in the
designated areas. See N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(c)(iii) (1996).
Federal law that protects the river includes 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1226 (1988)
(conservation of estuarine areas). Perhaps the most significant federal law that
has helped restore the ecological health of the river is the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The first suits against polluters of the Hudson River were brought in the late
1960s and early 1970s under the long ignored Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1988). For a description of these cases, see BOYLE, supra note 1, at 285-
88.
3. There are seven water districts that presently take drinking water from
the Hudson River. See Marine Sanitation Devices; Proposed Regulation to Es-
tablish Drinking Water Intake Zones in Two Sections of the Hudson River, New
York State, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,940 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 140).
4. The railroads impact access from Spuyten Duyvil to the Troy locks on
the east shore, and from West Haverstraw to the Town of Lloyd on the west
shore.
3
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In 1846, the New York State Legislature authorized the
incorporation of the Hudson River Railroad Company and the
construction of its right-of-way along the eastern shore of the
Hudson River as the railroad saw fit. By the end of 1851,
service had begun between New York City and East Green-
bush (the present terminal for Albany). The West Shore Rail-
road, affecting the western shore, was operational by the end
of 1884. Under terms similar to the Hudson River Railroad
Company, the West Shore Railroad was granted the shore of
the Hudson River by statute and letters patent.5
As a result of the state's generosity, the tidal Hudson
River is girded on the east and west by railroads. It is impos-
sible to determine the number of railroad crossings that have
been lost over the years, 6 but the railroad title maps of 1917
give some indication. Along the Hudson River line (extending
from Spuyten Duyvil to East Greenbush on the eastern
shore), approximately 42% of the railroad crossings that im-
pact access have been closed since 1917. 7 Some of these
crossings are or were private, however, private crossings
often did and do afford public access. Also, undoubtedly myr-
iad informal pedestrian crossings, which are not listed on the
5. This railroad was built to compete with the New York Central and Hud-
son River Railroad (successor to the Hudson River Railroad Company). One
year later, after a brief but furious rate war, the West Shore Railroad was bank-
rupt. The West Shore line may have been developed by straw men for the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the great rival of the New York Central. The
direct competition was settled when the New York Central bought the West
Shore line and the Pennsylvania Railroad bought a competing line that the
New York Central had under construction in Pennsylvania. See ARTHUR G. AD-
AMs, THE HUDSON THROUGH THE YEARS 211-14 (1983). This was the heyday of
railroad competition, unquestionably fed by New York's gift of approximately
twenty-eight miles of the Hudson River shoreline.
6. The railroad might keep records that could be tabulated.
7. Excluded from this calculation are the urban areas of Greenbush, Hud-
son, Poughkeepsie, and Beacon, on the grounds that closure of some of the mul-
tiple crossings within an urban area are irrelevant to functional access. Also
excluded are crossings north of Oscawana Island Park and south of Louisa
Street (Charles Point) in the Town of Cortlandt, because the railroad is well
inland through this segment. See MATTHEW R. ATINSON, PACE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LITIGATION CLINIC, INC., THE RAILROAD, THE HUDSON RIVER AND PUBLIC Ac-
CESS: LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES app. B (1995) (listing the
crossings on the Hudson Line identified from the railroad title maps of 1917)(on file with the Pace Environmental Law Review) [hereinafter PACE REPORT].
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maps, have been lost.8 Another indication of lost access are
the many wharves and docks shown on the railroad maps
which had no formal access as of 1917.
Despite the adverse impact of the railroad upon access,
the Hudson River line has been designated as a future home
for high-speed passenger rail service. 9 The Hudson line was
selected on the basis of cost. 10 Two lines which previously
provided passenger service between New York City and Al-
bany, the West Shore-" and Harlem' 2 lines, were not consid-
ered. The selection of the Hudson line for high-speed service
underscores the priority the state has assigned to high-speed
rail service. The goal is to implement high-speed service at
8. Informal pedestrian crossings are still used, primarily by fishermen.
Prior to the widespread pollution of the river, and the institution of electrified
commuter rail service, fishing and swimming were undoubtedly more common
and access obtained where convenient.
9. See infra part II.A. for a discussion of plans for high-speed rail service
in New York. Existing passenger service along the Hudson River is provided by
Metro-North's commuter service (running as far north as Poughkeepsie) and
Amtrak's service between New York City and Albany (with regular stops in
Yonkers, Croton, Poughkeepsie, Rhinecliff, and Hudson).
10. See NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOVING To-
WARD THE 21ST CENTURY: A PROPOSAL FOR HIGH-SPEED GROUND TRANSPORTA-
TION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1993) [hereinafter NYS PRoPoSAL].
11. The West Shore line is used by Conrail exclusively for freight and ad-
versely impacts access to the river for approximately forty miles. The Hudson
line adversely affects river access along most of its approximately 130 miles.
From the standpoint of minimizing the adverse impacts of high-speed rail ser-
vice to access to the Hudson River, redevelopment of the West Shore line is
preferable.
12. Metro-North provides commuter service as far north as Dover Plains on
the Harlem line. The Harlem line used to extend to Chatham, where it con-
nected with the Boston and Albany line, which is still used by Amtrak and
Conrail.
5
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the least cost.' 8 The adverse impact on coastal access is
secondary.' 4
The public trust doctrine is a legal principle that colors
all other doctrines touching upon the issue of access. This
doctrine holds that the river belongs to the people in common
forever. A necessary corollary to the doctrine is the public's
right to access public trust lands and waters. Public trust
doctrine and railroad operations along the Hudson River are
in conflict. Public policy has thus far reconciled the conflict in
favor of railroad operations. In order to understand the con-
flict, and as a first step to reordering the priorities for its res-
olution, an understanding of the factors and legal principles
that govern the issue of access is essential. To this end, this
article is organized as follows: Part II provides background
concerning high-speed rail proposals for New York and pres-
ent efforts to implement the service. Part III examines public
trust doctrine and other legal principles which govern access
to the river. Part IV proposes several means to improve pub-
lic access to the Hudson River. Part V concludes this article
and suggests that the problem of public access is indicative of
a broader historic negligence and the abuse of an extraordi-
nary natural resource. Public access is an issue that is in-
trinsically linked to the need to obtain a greater
understanding and appreciation of the functions and values
that the river serves, has served, and may serve again.
13. Inter-city high-speed ground transportation undoubtedly has benefits.
For instance, it encourages core inner city redevelopment, NYS PROPOSAL,
supra note 10, at 7, and reduces peripheral automobile dependent development
around airports. See Philip Weinberg, Public Transportation and Clean Air:
Natural Allies, 21 ENVTL. L. 1527, 1528-29 (1991). Finally, enhanced inter-city
service is an effective way to reduce total automobile and air passenger miles,
which are the most costly in terms of fuel and air pollution. See NEw YORK
STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, NEW YORK STATE
HIGH-SPEED SURFACE TRANSPORTATION STUDY § 4 (1994) (tables comparing en-
ergy use per passenger mile and external costs of existing air, auto, and rail
services and high speed ground transportation alternatives) [hereinafter NYS
STUDY]. See also Laurence E. Tobey, Costs, Benefits, and the Future of Amtrak,
15 TRANSP. L.J. 245, 278-80 (1987) (describing the positive impact Amtrak Me-
troliner service has had on airport and highway congestion).
14. The state denies that high-speed rail service will adversely impact Hud-
son River access. See infra part II.D.
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II. High-Speed Ground Transportation
A. The New York State Plan
High-speed ground transportation consists of three types
of service. Maglev, an experimental technology, is designed
to attain speeds of approximately 300 miles per hour. 15 Very
High Speed Rail (VHSR) refers to traditional steel wheel and
track technology operating at speeds between 150 and 200
miles per hour.16 Europe and Japan have had VHSR in reve-
15. Maglev is an acronym for electro-magnetic levitation. Prototypes are
currently being tested in Japan and Germany. NYS STUDY, supra note 13, at 1-
26. Powered by magnets, the trains are also magnetically levitated to eliminate
the friction of steel-wheel to rail technology. Designs have existed at least since
the early decades of this century. See e.g., Electric-Flyer Makes 500 Miles an
Hour - Traveling at 500 Miles Per Hour in the Future Electric Railway, THE
ELECTRIC EXPERIMENTER (Mar. 1917), reprinted in The High-Speed Rail Devel-
opment Act of 1993, and Current Initiatives in High-Speed Ground Transporta-
tion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21
(1993) [hereinafter Hearings].
16. See NYS PROPOSAL, supra note 10, at 1-2. Potential maximum speeds
are much higher. The French Train A Grande Vitesee (TGV) reached 320 miles
per hour in one demonstration, and the German Intercity Express (ICE) train
has been tested at 250 miles per hour. Taylor Moore, High-Speed Rail Heading
Down the Track, 19 EPRI J. 25, 25 (Mar. 1994). The speeds are not practical for
revenue service because, at such high speeds, the tracks are damaged. Optimal
service is typically electrified and provided on a dedicated track. NYS STUDY,
supra note 13, at 1-2. Germany's ICE trains, however, share the tracks with
freight trains operating at 160 km/hr (100 mph). EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF
MINISTERS OF TRANSPORT, ROUND TABLE 87: HIGH-SPEED TRAINS 11, 13 (1992).
7
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nue service for many years. 17 High-speed rail operates at
sustained speeds of 125 to 150 miles per hour.1 8
New York's inter-city ground transportation plan for the
Empire Corridor' 9 is to gradually implement high-speed rail
17. France first implemented VHSR with the TGV train set in 1981, operat-
ing at speeds of 165 miles per hour. Hearings, supra note 15, at 68 (statement
of Larry E. Salci, Pres., Bombardier Corp.). The TGV now runs at speeds of 186
mph. NYS STUDY, supra note 13, at 1-15. The Eurostar commenced passenger
service between Paris, Brussels and London (via the English Channel Tunnel,
or Chunnel) on November 14, 1994. Chunnel Passenger Trains Makes Inaugu-
ral Run, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994, at A10. The Paris link to the Chunnel is
planned to operate at 200 mph. Hearings, supra note 15, at 54 (statement of
Joseph Vranch, Pres., High Speed Rail/Maglev Ass'n). Germany's ICE trains,
introduced in 1992, run at up to 180 mph. Moore, supra note 16, at 25; Peter H.Stone, The Faster Track: Should We Build a High-Speed Rail System?, 11
AMERICAN PROSPECT 99, 100 (Fall 1992). In 1992, Spain introduced the Alta
Velocidad Espanol (AVE) train operating at comparable speeds. Hearings,
supra note 15, at 53 (statement of Joseph Vranich, Pres., High Speed Rail/
Maglev Ass'n). Italy also has train sets operating at speeds up to 186 mph.
Moore, supra note 16, at 25.
Commercial VHSR service began with the Bullet Train in Japan during the
late 1950s. The Bullet Train, operating between Tokyo and Osaka, now travels
at speeds of up to 170 mph. Stone, supra, at 100. In April 1994, Korea signed a
contract to implement the French TGV service between Seoul and Pusan.
Asia's Big New Train Set, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1994, at 67. Other Asian coun-
tries actively planning VHSR include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philip-
pines. Id.
18. NYS PROPOSAL, supra note 10, at 3 (planning for high-speed rail in the
Empire Corridor to operate at speeds of up to 125 mph through incremental
improvements); NYS STUDY, supra note 13, at 1-2 (defining "incremental rail"
as designed to obtain speeds of up to 150 mph). Federal railroad law defines
"high-speed" as rail service operating at speeds in excess of 125 mph. 45 U.S.C.
§ 831(n) (West Supp. 1994).
Only the New York City to Washington, D.C., portion of the Northeast Cor-
ridor presently offers what could be called high-speed rail service in the United
States. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is presently implementing
improvements in the New York City to Boston segment to permit maximum
speeds of 150 mph. 2 FED. R.R. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE NORTHEAST
CORRIDOR TRANSPORTATION PLAN, B-2 app. B (1994) [hereinafter FRA PLAN] (is-
sued in response to the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-533 § 4, 106 Stat. 3515, 3516 (1992) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 24903 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the Secretary of Transportation to
develop a program of improvements which would reduce the trip time between
New York and Boston to three hours or less)).
19. The New York City to Albany to Buffalo route. In re National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Harnett, 572 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1991).
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and to encourage the development of maglev.20 The existing
infrastructure is suitable for high-speed rail, with several
modifications. Tilt trains are capable of operating at speeds
of up to 150 miles per hour on much of the existing track.
21
The locomotives, however, will have to be self-propelled to
save the cost of electrification.22 Grade crossings must also
be eliminated where feasible. 23 The presence of freight and
20. See generally NYS PROPosAL, supra note 10. The plan is based on a
cost/benefit analysis that excludes VHSR. VHSR requires twin dedicated and
electrified tracks with no grade crossings. NYS STUDY, supra note 13, at 1-2.
To implement VHSR, the existing right-of-way in the Empire Corridor (from
New York City to Buffalo) would require considerable straightening. Id. at 10.
An aggressive realignment of the track would permit average speeds of 116
mph. Id. at 10-11. The projected capital cost, including new train sets and the
electrification of the line, is $7 billion. Id. at 23. On the other hand, improve-
ment of the existing infrastructure, without electrification, and the acquisition
of new tilt train sets would permit high-speed rail service to average speeds of
99 mph (assuming top speeds of 150 mph). Id. at 10-11. The estimated cost of
this high-speed service is between $1 and $2 billion. Id. at 23.
Maglev would average speeds of 187 mph and cost $17 billion. Id. Despite
the higher costs, maglev is attractive because it would cost no more to operate
than VHSR, while drawing a much larger share of the existing ground and air
passenger market. NYS PROPOSAL, supra note 10, at 7. New York also hopes
that maglev will become a major industry located in state. Id. at 10.
21. NYS STUDY, supra note 13, at 1-8. Tilt trains are a technology whereby
the train leans into the curve to permit higher speeds without altering the su-
perelevation of the track. Id. at 1-10. Superelevation, measured in inches, is
the difference in elevation along a curve between the inside and outside track.
Id.
22. Electrification of the New Haven to Boston segment of the Northeast
Corridor is the single greatest expense, $360 million, FRA PLAN, supra note 18,
at I-5 tbl. I-1 (in 1993 constant dollars), in the $2 billion budget to provide high-
speed service and expanded capacity between New York and Boston. Id. at V-8
to V-9 tbl. V-1 (itemizing costs to reduce trip time and to provide for increased
service demands).
The locomotives also must have sufficient acceleration (weight to power ra-
tio) to benefit from the top speeds obtainable. See NYS STUDY, supra note 13, at
1-25. On October 14, 1994, Amtrak began testing a non-revenue gas-turbine
locomotive between Schenectady and Hudson that is expected to meet the re-
quired specifications. See New York State Department of Transportation Grant
Application for the National High Speed Ground Transportation Technology
Demonstration Project (Oct. 15, 1993); Petition for Waiver for Test Program
National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 59 Fed. Reg. 39,013 (1994). The
track will also require upgrading throughout much of the corridor.
23. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
9
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passenger services on the same tracks requires the testing
and implementation of superior vehicle control systems.24
The capital cost is the single greatest obstacle to imple-
mentation of maglev service. 25 Maglev requires a completely
new right-of-way, track, and train sets.26 The right-of-way is-
sue and cost necessitate government investment, probably
both federal and state.27 In addition to the competition for
government transportation dollars, implementation of
maglev, and to a lesser extent high-speed rail, is potentially
adverse to the automobile and airline industries which have
lobbied against government investment in high-speed ground
transportation. 28
New York anticipated substantial federal assistance with
the implementation of high-speed rail service in the Empire
24. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
25. Maglev service from New York City to Albany would cost approximately
$7 billion. NYS PROPOSAL, supra note 10, at 18. See also Moore, supra note 16,
at 20; Stone, supra note 17, at 101.
26. Maglev probably would be constructed upon an elevated guideway
within the NYS Thruway right-of-way. The cost of additional right-of-way has
not been calculated. NYS STUDY, supra note 13, at 5-1.
27. Stone, supra note 17, at 101; Dean Patterson, Funding High-Speed
Rail: There Has Got to be a Government Role, BOND BvER, July 7, 1994, at 6.
28. Douglas Turner, High-Speed Rail Funding Package Discourages Maglev
Supporters, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 29, 1993, at 7 (noting that two congressional
foes of rail transit are strong supporters of the auto industry and highway
spending); Next Stop, America?, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1993, at 106 (noting that
some U.S. airlines, led by Southwest Airlines, oppose high-speed rail and
maglev investment). Southwest Airlines played a significant role in defeating a
VHSR system in Texas that required state subsidized financing. Patterson,
supra note 27, at 6; Dan Charles, High-Speed Rail Dreams Not Becoming a
Reality (National Public Radio, Transcript No. 1627-11, Oct. 6, 1994); Glen
Biggs, High-Speed Rail Didn't Succeed This Time; But It's Still Necessary,
HOUSTON POST, Sept. 18, 1994, at C3. See also NYS STUDY, supra note 13, at 3-
21 to 3-27 (forecasting that maglev could take 84.7% of the market share for
local airline service).
Airlines in Italy and Germany, however, view maglev and high-speed rail
service as potentially supplemental to their core air service. Lufthansa oper-
ated a high-speed rail link between the Frankfurt and Duseldorf airports. The
train is now operated by German Railway. Moore, supra note 16, at 27; Hear-
ings, supra note 15, at 59-60 (statement of Joseph Vranich, Pres., High Speed
Rail/Maglev Ass'n) (Aitalia Airlines commencing rail service from Rome airport
to Florence and Naples). The use of airports as ground transportation hubs,
however, diminishes the benefits of direct inter-city service. See supra note 13
(discussing the benefits of inter-city high-speed ground transportation).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/28
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Corridor. It was estimated that implementation will cost
nearly $1 billion, of which almost three quarters would be
supplied by the federal government. 29 This estimate of fed-
eral assistance was based upon Senator Moynihan's active
support coupled with President Clinton's 1993 proposal for a
$1.3 billion high-speed rail development program.30 Presi-
dent Clinton's proposal, however, was whittled to $184 mil-
lion for studies and demonstration projects over the next
three years.3 1 No funds were allocated for the necessary capi-
tal improvements.3 2 Despite the lack of funding for high-
speed rail service in general, the New York Department of
29. NYS PROPosAL, supra note 10, at 14.
30. Id.
31. The Swift Rail Development Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat.
4615 (1994).
32. Federal support for high-speed ground transportation has diminished
over the years. The High-Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-220, 79 Stat. 893 (1965), authorized the Secretary of Commerce to un-
dertake research and development of high-speed ground transportation and
fund demonstration projects. Id. §§ 1 & 2, 79 Stat. 893, 893. A demonstration
was held in 1967 on a section of the Northeast Corridor in which speeds of up to
165 miles per hour were reached. Hearings, supra note 15, at 65 (statement of
Larry E. Salci, Pres., Bombardier Corp.).
Revenue service on the Metroliner began in 1970 and reached speeds of 125
miles per hour. Tobey, supra note 13, at 251. By this time, however, rail pas-
senger service in general was in serious decline. Id. at 249-50. To ensure the
survival of inter-city passenger rail service, Congress created Amtrak in 1970.
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327 (1970)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 24301-24315 (West 1994)). The Act re-
quired the Secretary of Transportation to make recommendations concerning
opportunities for the provision of"faster service." 84 Stat. 1327, 1329. Amtrak
was authorized to improve the infrastructure and rolling stock along the North-
east Corridor to improve high-speed rail service. Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210 §§ 701, 703, 90 Stat. 31, 119,
121 (1976) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 801, 851 (1988)). The In-
termodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), Pub. L. No. 102-240,
105 Stat. 1914 (1991) (amended by Pub. L. No. 102-334, 106 Stat. 858, Pub. L.
No. 102-338, 106 Stat. 1520, 1550, 1552, 1555, 1561-66, 1568, Pub. L. No. 102-
580, 106 Stat. 4797, 4823 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered titles and
sections)), was a comprehensive measure to improve all sectors of surface trans-
portation. Section 1036 authorized the Secretary to promote and support the
development of high-speed steel-wheel and maglev rail service. ISTEA
§ 1036(c)(1), 105 Stat. 1914, 1982 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 309 (Supp. V. 1993)).
Funding was intended to be generous, especially for maglev development, see
ISTEA § 1036(d), 105 Stat. 1914, 1986 (allocating $225,000,000 per annum
through 1997), however, the following year funding was sharply curtailed. See
11
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Transportation (DOT) continues to prepare for future service
by fencing and seeking the closure of grade crossings. 33
B. The Regulatory Structure
The safe operation of railroads in the United States is
under the general jurisdiction of the Department of Trans-
portation (USDOT).3 4 The USDOT is specifically responsible
for coordinating all federal involvement with the develop-
ment and implementation of high-speed ground transporta-
tion, including maglev.3 5  The regulatory authority
pertaining to safety is principally under the jurisdiction of
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), an administra-
tion within the USDOT.36
Grade crossing control devices are technically under the
jurisdiction of the Federal Highway Administration
Pub. L. No. 102-388, 106 Stat. 1520, 1535 (1992) (eliminating all maglev
funding).
The Swift Rail Development Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat.
4615 (1994), sets the low-water mark for federal sponsorship of high-speed
ground transportation. The Act states that implementation is primarily the re-
sponsibility of local and state governments. Id. § 102 (5), 108 Stat. 4615, 4615.
After acknowledging the success of the subsidized Metroliner service in the
Northeast Corridor, the Act states that no "new" service should receive federal
operating and maintenance subsidies. Id. § 102(3), (4), 108 Stat. 4615, 4615.
Applicability of the provision to improve the existing service in the Empire Cor-
ridor is unclear. There are, however, federal matching funds available to the
states for environmental assessments of proposed high-speed rail service. Id.
33. See e.g., PACE REPORT, supra note 7, at B-5 (closure plan in Castleton-
on-Hudson, replacing grade crossings with a pedestrian tunnel). Although the
implementation of high-speed rail requires the elimination of most grade cross-
ings, the policy for grade crossing elimination is longstanding and independent
of high-speed rail. See infra part III.B.2.
34. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43a, 421-445, 501-658, 801-855, 1101-1116 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); 49 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
35. 49 U.S.C. § 309 (Supp. V 1993).
36. Id. § 103; 49 C.F.R. § 1.4(e)(3) (1995). Many acts of Congress authorize
the Secretary of Transportation to regulate the safety and operations of rail-
roads, including the sponsoring of innovations in rail service. This authority is
largely delegated to the FRA. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.49 (1995) (enumerating specific
delegations). FRA regulations are published in 49 C.F.R. §§ 200-66 (1995). The
FRA is specifically responsible for safety appliances, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20306
(West Supp. 1995); signal systems, Id. §§ 20501-20505; locomotives, Id.
§§ 20701-20703; accident investigations, Id. §§ 20901-20903; hours of service,
Id. §§ 21101-07; and enforcement Id. §§ 21301-11.
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(FHWA).37 The FRA, however, regulates the safe operation of
trains and establishes maximum operating speeds which are
dependent, in part, on the grade crossing technology em-
ployed.38 The FRA also sponsors demonstrations of train con-
trol systems, some of which are directly tied to grade
crossings.39 As a practical matter, therefore, the FRA and
the FHWA must agree on grade crossing technology in order
to implement high-speed rail service.40
FRA regulations govern operating speeds of up to 110
miles per hour.4 1 Operating speeds in excess of 110 miles per
hour are prohibited without the prior approval of the FRA.42
High-speed rail service, therefore, is regulated on a case by
case basis.43 FRA approval of speeds in excess of 110 miles
per hour is dependent, in part, upon the presence of grade
crossings and the types of controls employed.
Where speeds are anticipated to reach between 110 and
125 miles per hour, the FRA requires deployment of impene-
trable barriers.44 The FRA is officially requiring the elimina-
37. 49 U.S.C. §§ 104, 20134 (West Supp. 1995).
38. Id. § 24308(d); 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (1994).
39. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 46,470 (1994).
40. See generally FED. R.R. ADMIN., RAIL-HIGHWAY CROSSING SAFETY, Ac-
TION PLAN SUPPORT PROPOSALS (1994).
41. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (classifying track for maximum operating speeds).
42. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(c) (1994).
43. A carrier wishing to operate a train set at speeds in excess of 110 miles
per hour must petition the FRA for an exemption or waiver. 49 C.F.R.
§§ 213.9(c), 213.17(b) (1994). Waivers are granted at the discretion of the Rail-
road Safety Board. Id. §§ 211.7, 211.9, 211.41, 213.9(c), 213.17. The FRA, how-
ever, is drafting regulations applicable to high-speed rail service. See 59 Fed.
Reg. 57,147, 57,149, 57,162 (1994) (stating that the FRA will promulgate safety
rules in 1995 for rail service operating at speeds of up to 160 miles per hour); 60
Fed. Reg. 60,428-29 (1995) (determining that generic high-speed standards will
not be promulgated, but that the FRA will address specific issues through ap-
propriate rulemaking).
44. Letter from James T. McQueen, Associate Administrator for Railroad
Development, Federal Railroad Administration, to Matthew R. Atkinson, Re-
search Fellow, Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic, Inc. (Oct. 25, 1994) (on file
with author). An impenetrable barrier is defined as one that can withstand the
force of a 45,000 pound truck travelling at 45 miles per hour. The cost and
technology required to deploy such a barrier essentially requires the closure of
grade crossings, or a reduction of speed at grade crossings (compromising high-
speed service). Telephone Interview with Donald A. Baker, Policy & Program
Director, DOT (Sept. 15, 1994).
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tion of all grade crossings where speeds in excess of 125 miles
per hour are obtained.45 The FRA, however, has shown some
flexibility in the Northeast Corridor concerning the necessity
of closing grade crossings that affect coastal access. 46 The ef-
ficacy of the control technology employed will determine the
maximum permitted speeds at grade crossings.47
Although high-speed rail service must be approved by
the FRA, the DOT coordinates and furthers the implementa-
tion of high-speed rail service with Amtrak and the FRA. 48
The DOT also has the crucial authority to close grade
crossings. 49
45. Letter from James T. McQueen, Associate Administrator for Railroad
Development, Federal Railroad Administration, to Matthew R. Atkinson, Re-
search Fellow, Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic, Inc. (Oct. 25, 1994) (on file
with author).
46. Grade crossings that implicate coastal access in the Northeast Corridor
are in Connecticut. Connecticut law requires that "new or improved shoreline
rail corridors" improve coastal access, or, at the most, have a negligible adverse
impact upon access. Connecticut Coastal Management Act, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 22a-92(c)(1)(F) (West 1995). The Connecticut statute has influenced the
FRA's application of its general obligation to close grade crossings in the North-
east Corridor under the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-533, 106 Stat. 3515 (1992) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 650(a) (Supp.
V 1993)) (closure mandate); 45 U.S.C. § 650(b) (allowing the FRA to develop
alternatives to grade crossing elimination where safety and necessity permits),
at least partly because state law governs actual closures. FRA PLAN, supra note
18, app. A, at 1. For example, the FRA considered closure of a crossing, the
legality of which was in dispute, that provides access to a beach. Amtrak claims
that the crossing is illegal and leads solely to land owned by the railroad. The
FRA, nonetheless, recommends construction of a pedestrian tunnel to provide
coastal access. Id. at IV-8 to IV-15. Another case involved a private marina
open to the public, where Amtrak urged condemnation of either the crossing or
the entire property. Id. at IV-135. The FRA decided that acquisition of the
property might violate the Connecticut Coastal Management Act, id. at IV-137,
and recommended the consideration of improved grade crossing control technol-
ogy because grade-separation was not feasible. Id. at IV-117, IV-124, IV-131.
47. Control technologies advise and control the train when there are
hazards and limit vehicular and pedestrian access to the tracks. The FRA is
authorized to fund demonstrations of these technologies sponsored by inter-
ested states. See, e.g., Notice of Pre-Application Forum for Next Generation
High-Speed Rail Program: Demonstration of High Speed Positive Train Con-
trol System, 59 Fed. Reg. 46,470 (1994) (encouraging applications for grants to
test control systems). New York is expected to apply for these funds.
48. N.Y. TRANsP. LAW § 14-c (McKinney 1994).
49. See infra part III.B.2. (Grade Crossing Elimination). The DOT also reg-
ulates signage, crossing control technology, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/28
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C. Specific Impacts on Hudson River Access
Public access to the eastern shore of the Hudson River is
limited by the presence of the railroad right-of-way which is
largely constructed on filled tidal and submerged lands.50 To
access the river, the public must cross the tracks. Where a
crossing is grade-separated, access may be impacted by the
financial cost of maintenance. 51 Public safety and railroad li-
ability have long favored the minimization of grade
crossings. 52
The DOT intends to eliminate, improve, or replace each
grade crossing on a case by case basis in consultation with
whichever local government, or individual, controls the cross-
ing.53 In addition, the DOT intends to fence portions of the
17(B), pts. 220, 277, 278, 279 (1995), and railroad safety generally. N.Y. Comp.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 17(C), pts. 910-24 (1995).
50. High-speed rail service will only affect the eastern shore. Nonetheless,
grade crossings also pose a hazard to commuter rail operated by the Metropoli-
tan Transportation Authority (MTA) on the eastern shore and to Conrail, oper-
ating on the eastern and western shores. Two MTA plans may adversely affect
access to the river.
The MTA is considering extension of commuter service from Poughkeepsie
to Rhinecliff. METRo-NORTH, 1995-1999 STRATEGIC BUSINESS PLAN 25 (Aug. 29,
1994). The extension of commuter service, if implemented, would increase train
traffic on the segment and thereby increase pressure to limit access through
fencing and the closure of grade crossings. The MTA also is considering three
Hudson River crossings under six options for expanded commuter rail service.
METRO-NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD, FEAsIBILITY AND BENEFIT-COST STUDY OF
TRANs-HuDSON, CROSS-WESTCHESTER AND STEwART AIRPORT RAIL LINKS (1994).
The alternatives are the subject of an EIS now being prepared. Five of the six
alternatives under consideration provide for commuter service on the West
Shore line between West Nyack and Newburgh. Id. at S-2. Within the pro-
posed service area, the railroad is adjacent to the river north of the Village of
West Haverstraw to Newburgh, a distance of twenty-four railroad miles. Com-
muter service in this segment would adversely affect the already scarce public
access unless the existing grade crossings were preserved. Although pedestrian
bridges could be constructed at the grade crossings, vehicle bridges, which are
essential to replace grade crossings which serve boat ramps, are impractical at
many locations. For a list of the involved crossings, see PACE REPORT, supra
note 7, at app. A.
51. N.Y. R.R. LAW § 93 (McKinney 1991) governs the allocation of costs for
bridge maintenance. The inability of a local government to pay its share may
result in the closure of the crossing. See infra part uI.B.3.
52. See infra parts III.B.2. and III.B.6.
53. Telephone Interview with Donald A. Baker, Policy & Program Bureau
Director, DOT (Sept. 14, 1994). The only state-wide body with whom the DOT
15
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Empire Corridor where unauthorized crossings are a prob-
lem. 54 The fencing is intended to eliminate crossings not rec-
ognized by the DOT and to otherwise prevent casual access to
the tracks. 55 Although the DOT represents the fencing and
grade crossing closures as a deliberative and access neutral
process, the number of crossings at stake is a matter of dis-
pute, and there is a lack of evidence that closures generally
are preceded by formal notice and hearings.
56
The Hudson River Access Forum (Access Forum) has
identified forty-one grade crossings between Rensselaer and
Croton-On-Hudson. 57 The Access Forum also identified
twenty-three crossings, grade and grade-separated, that have
coordinates crossing closures is the Greenway Council. The Greenway Council
is within the executive department, created pursuant to N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 44-0101 to 44-0121 (McKinney Supp. 1995). The purpose of the council
is to promote the "preservation, enhancement and development of the . . .
scenic, natural, historic, cultural and recreational resources of the Hudson river
valley while continuing to emphasize economic development activities ... ." Id.
§ 44-0101.
Private crossings are not considered a substantial problem. The DOT be-
lieves that train dispatcher controlled locking gates are adequate to control
these crossings. Telephone Interview with Donald A. Baker, Policy & Program
Bureau Director, DOT (Sept. 14, 1994). Nonetheless, peak hour rail service,
especially on the commuter lines, will limit private at-grade access substan-
tially. In addition, when high-speed rail service is implemented, the burden of
improving access may hinder transfers of private lands for public use, or trans-
fers of public land to recreational use. See, e.g., PACE REPORT, supra note 7, at
B-3 to B-4 (plan to create public park at Cow Island, Village of Castleton, in
question because of agreement with railroad governing grade crossing).
54. "To help control access to the right-of-way, 75 miles of fencing will be
installed in urban areas and other key locations." NYS PROPOSAL, supra note
10, at 23. The preliminary budget for fencing is $10 million.
55. See supra note 55. The elimination of even improved grade crossings is
a high priority. See infra part III.B.2.
56. In response to a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request sent to the
DOT asking for any information concerning grade crossing closures, formal pro-
ceedings were disclosed concerning only three crossings. See PACE REPORT,
supra note 7, at app. B. Although archived fies were not requested, the dis-
closed records dated from the early 1970s. The DOT probably ignores the clo-
sure of "unrecognized" or "private" crossings, regardless of historic public use.
57. THE HUDSON RIVER ACCESS FORUM, BETWEEN THE RAILROAD AND THE
RIVER: PUBLIC ACCESS ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES ALONG THE TIDAL HUDSON
137-44 (1989) [hereinafter ACCESS FORUM].
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been closed.58 A subsequent study by the Pace Environmen-
tal Litigation Clinic (Pace Report) agreed with the number of
total closures, although the status of several crossings had
changed. 59 The DOT has variously reported the number of
grade crossings as fifteen between New York City and Stuy-
vesant,60 nineteen between Croton-On-Hudson and Stuyve-
sant (a lesser distance), and twenty-seven between Croton-
On-Hudson and Rensselaer (where the Access Forum identi-
fied forty-one). 61 Neither the Access Forum nor the DOT in-
dicates any grade crossings south of Croton.
The Pace Report identified informal pedestrian crossings,
that were not considered by the Access Forum, which might
have legal protection.62 Below Croton, the Pace Report iden-
tified five pedestrian crossings that are in regular use, or
have been recently obstructed, where there is evidence of a
public right to use the crossing.63 Above Croton, six pedes-
trian crossings were identified that are used by the public. 64
The discrepancy in the grade crossing totals reflects the
different ways in which grade crossings are being counted.
Specifically, the DOT does not recognize the existence of in-
formal crossings that exist in fact. In such situations, clo-
sures occur by railroad and/or DOT fiat where there is no
public or private authority to defend the crossing.65 As a con-
sequence, the DOT discounts the impact of fencing and grade
crossing closures on public access to the Hudson River.66
58. Id. at 137-45. The study area of the Access Forum did not include
Bronx County.
59. PACE REPORT, supra note 7, at 30 and n.144.
60. NYS PRoPosAL, supra note 10, at 22.
61. New York State Department of Transportation, USDOT National Grade
Crossing Inventory (July 6, 1994) (on file with author).
62. The basis for legal protection is discussed infra parts HI.C.2.-4.
63. See PACE REPORT, supra note 7, at app. A.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 56.
66. An informal crossing long used for recreational purposes by the public
lacks organizational representation. Fencing may appear as a fait accompli to
individuals without the financial ability or motivation to lobby or litigate on
behalf of their larger constituency. Private landowners may also permit infor-
mal coastal access. While public use alone does not create a public easement,
nonetheless, if the DOT secures the railroad right-of-way, a de facto adverse
1996] 763
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D. Procedural Review of Adverse Impacts to Access
New York has no law specifically addressing the impact
of rail corridor improvements on coastal access.67 The DOT,
however, must comply with New York coastal policy and pro-
cedures as embodied in the Waterfront Revitalization of
Coastal Areas and Inland Waterways Law (Coastal Law),68
in addition to environmental review procedures under the
State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). 69
The Coastal Law authorizes and encourages local gov-
ernments to develop waterfront revitalization plans.70 First,
it requires state agencies to complete a Coastal Assessment
Form (CAF) when planning an action in a coastal zone prior
to making a determination of significance under SEQRA. 71
Second, it requires agencies to act consistently with the poli-
cies of the law and with approved local revitalization plans to
the "maximum extent practicable." 72 Finally, it provides for
impact on public access will result. For further discussion of the public use of
the public and private paths and roads, see infra parts III.C.3.-4.
67. Such a law in Connecticut appears to have helped coastal access despite
infrastructure improvements in the Northeast Corridor rail system. See supra
note 46.
68. N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 910-22 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1996). The state
Act was prompted by the federal Coastal Zone Management Act. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1451-1464 (1994). The federal Act encourages states to develop consistent
coastal management programs to further the declared federal policy "to pre-
serve protect, develop, and where it is possible, to restore or enhance, the re-
sources of the Nation's coastal zone for this and succeeding generations. .. "
Id. § 1452(1). The encouragement takes the form of federal funding for ap-
proved programs. Id. §§ 1454-1455a. Once a program is approved, federal
agency actions within an approved coastal zone must conform "to the maximum
extent practicable" to the program. Id. § 1456(c)(1). Approved programs should
provide for "public access to the coasts for recreation purposes." Id.
§ 1452(2)(D). For full discussions of the federal statute see NICHOLAS A. ROBIN-
SON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY ch. 17 (1994); LINDA A.
MALONE, ENVIRoNMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE ch. 2 (1994).
69. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 &
Supp. 1996). Department of Environmental Conservation regulations, issued
under the authority of § 8-0113, describe the types of agency actions that re-
quire the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REG., tit. 6, pt. 617 (1996).
70. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 915 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1996).
71. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.4 (1994).
72. N.Y. EXEc. LAw §§ 916(b), 919(1) (McKinney 1982); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 19, §§ 600.4(c), 600.5 (1994). If a locality objects to a state
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/28
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New York Secretary of State oversight of agency actions
within coastal zones. 73 The governing policy is the require-
ment that an agency balance economic development with the
beneficial use, conservation, and access to coastal resources.
74
Where the coastal lands are publicly owned, the policy is to
provide access to such lands. 75
The DOT does not believe that the preparation of an En-
vironmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required for the incre-
mental implementation of high-speed service. 76 The DOT
further states that its plans have been reviewed by the De-
partment of State and the Department of Environmental
Conservation and that these agencies do not believe a
programmatic EIS is required.77
agency action on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the local waterfront
development plan, the agency's determination will be upheld provided that it
can marshall "substantial evidence" to justify its decision. City of New Rochelle
v. Public Service Comm'n, 541 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1989) (uphold-
ing Commission's determination of where to locate transition station despite
New Rochelle's contention that the action was inconsistent with its waterfront
plan).
73. N.Y. Exuc. LAW §§ 913(4), 916(1) (McKinney 1982). The New York Sec-
retary of State promulgates regulations under the Waterfront Revitalization of
Coastal Areas and Inland Waterways Law (Coastal Law). N.Y. CoMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 19, pts. 600-603 (1994).
74. N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 912. The regulations enlarge upon the statutory pub-
lic access policy as follows: "Protect, maintain and increase the levels and types
of access to public water-related recreation resources and facilities so that these
resources and facilities may be fully utilized by all the public in accordance with
reasonably anticipated public recreation needs. . . ." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 19, § 600.5(e)(1).
75. Id. § 600.5(e)(2).
76. The DOT reasons that no acquisition of additional right-of-way is antici-
pated along the Hudson River and the alteration of signaling systems and an
increase in the speed of service, standing alone, do not have environmental im-
pacts. The DOT concedes that the removal of crossings, or the construction of
grade-separated crossings, might require the preparation of site specific EISs.
Telephone Interview with Donald A. Baker, Policy & Program Bureau Director,
DOT (Dec. 5, 1994).
77. Id. The FRA also is not planning to prepare an EIS under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Telephone Interview with Mark Yachmetz,
FRA Chief of Passenger Program Division (Sept. 27, 1994). While the FRA is
the agency authorizing funds for the Northeast Corridor, no federal funds are
presently available for capital projects in the Empire Corridor. At present, the
only action FRA will take concerning the Empire Corridor will be the approval,
19
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The DOT rests heavily on the assertion that it does not
have a high-speed rail plan per se, but only a plan to "im-
prove" the infrastructure, which will improve existing ser-
vice, as well as facilitate high-speed service. This "no plan"
plan appears designed to avoid environmental review.78
The DOT's position also depends on its debatable asser-
tion, without formal findings, that it will not diminish coastal
access. Under the provisions of the Coastal Law and SEQRA,
such an adverse impact would require an EIS, and any plan
that affects access would require preparation of a CAF. 79 The
DOT has not prepared one EIS or CAF in view of its closure
plans.80
The requirement of an EIS turns upon whether there
may be the potential for an adverse environmental impact by
or disapproval, of high-speed service. The FRA does not consider its approval to
have an environmental impact. Id.
78. New York's "little NEPA," SEQRA, presumes that an environmental
impact statement (EIS) must be prepared if the agency action "may" have the
potential for a significant environmental impact. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 6, § 617.7. The refusal to consider the high-speed rail implementation as a
"plan" violates SEQRA's proscription of the segmentation of agency actions to
avoid environmental review. Id. §§ 617.2(ag), 617.3(g)(1).
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70d (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (applicable to federal
agency actions), sets a higher threshold for EIS review. Under NEPA, the
agency action only requires EIS review if the action "will" have an impact. See
40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1995) (no environmental impact statement required when
the action will not have a "significant effect on the human environment"). The
FRA treatment of the Northeast Corridor improvements as requiring substan-
tial environmental review stands in stark contrast to the DOT's "no plan" plan
to make similar improvements without general environmental review, despite
the lower threshold for New York State agencies to prepare an EIS than that of
the FRA under NEPA. FRA environmental impact review to date for the
Northeast Corridor has been general, NORTHEAST CORRIDOR IMPROVEMENT PRO-
JECT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1978), and site spe-
cific, FRA PLAN, supra note 18, at I-11 ("more than 160 site specific
environmental reviews.., have been prepared by the FRA to address individ-
ual subcomponents of the project.").
79. An agency considering an action that might affect coastal access is re-
quired to submit a Coastal Assessment Form (CAF) to the Secretary of State
before making a determination of significance under SEQRA. See supra note
71.
80. The DOT stated that no EISs or CAFs have been prepared concerning
public access in response to a FOIL request sent by the author.
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limitations on access.8 ' Without comprehensive study, the
threshold question cannot be answered definitively (the pur-
pose of an EIS review), but there are several indications that
the implementation of high-speed service, or preparation for
the same, will result in diminished access. The closures
noted by the Access Forum and the Pace Report,8 2 the dis-
crepancy in the number of actual crossings, and the plan to
fence the corridor which will cut off DOT unrecognized access,
including informal access, all point to a substantial likelihood
that implementation of the DOT's plans will adversely affect
access to the river.
III. Substantive Law Affecting Access to the
Hudson River
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
1. Introduction
The inalienable right of the general public to use coastal
and navigable waters is the essence of the public trust doc-
trine. To insure the public right, the trust limits the private
appropriation of lands under water clothed with the trust.
The public trust doctrine applies to the public's right to ac-
cess the Hudson River in two ways. The first issue is one of
access. The corollary to the public trust doctrine is that the
alienation of trust lands is unlawful if the right to use re-
maining trust lands and waters is unreasonably denied.8 3
The second issue is the extent of the state's power to grant
trust lands to railroads and the title such grants convey.
These issues overlap because the grant of trust lands to rail-
roads adversely affects public access to the remaining trust
lands and waters of the Hudson River.
81. Noise and vibration are issues that also should be considered. The is-
sues are important because of the proximity of the right-of-way to recreational
locations and residential communities along the Hudson.
82. See supra part II.C.
83. The New Jersey Supreme Court indicated that it would go further and
consider imposing a public easement over non-trust private lands where neces-
sary to give meaningful effect to the right of the public to access and use trust
lands and waters. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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Granting over half the shoreline to railroads, to the com-
plete exclusion of access, violates the right of the public to
access the river and the sovereign responsibility of the state
under the public trust doctrine. 84 Public trust doctrine,
therefore, grafts limitations on the railroads' title to trust
lands, as well as on the state's power to alienate the public's
trust lands.
2. Background
a. Historical Antecedents
A recurring judicial question is whether the state has the
power to extinguish the public trust in lands under water.
The decisions of the New York courts considering this issue
are inconsistent. A cause for this inconsistency is the histori-
cal and political context in which the public trust doctrine
developed.
Although the doctrine reaches far into antiquity, the first
codification is ascribed to the Roman Emperor Justinian in
the sixth century A.D.85 The Justinian Code declared that
the use of the shore, sea, and rivers were common public
rights8 6 Under Roman law, therefore, some lands were not
susceptible to private ownership as we understand private
ownership today.8 7 The roots of the doctrine were in Greek
natural philosophy88 which subsequently served, perhaps un-
intentionally, as a check on the power of government, akin to
a natural bill of rights.
The history of the doctrine under English common law
began with the Magna Carta's limitation on obstructing navi-
gation in rivers.8 9 Thereafter, the doctrine developed piece-
meal under the common law.90 The principal modification of
84. See infra part IIIA.3.c.iii.
85. DAvm C. SLADE, P=rrING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 4
(1990); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Doc-
trine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763 (1970) [hereinafter Submerged Doctrine].
86. SLADE, supra note 85, at 5.
87. A fundamental element of private property is the owner's right to ex-
clude others. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
88. SLADE, supra note 85, at 4; Submerged Doctrine, supra note 85, at 763.
89. Submerged Doctrine, supra note 85, at 765-67.
90. Id.
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Roman law was a division of trust lands into two interests.
Trust lands could be held privately, an interest termed the
jus privatum, subject to public rights, termed the jus pub-
licum.91 This division continues to confound the doctrine
today.
The Crown held the jus privatum in a proprietary capac-
ity, and the jus publicum in trust for the people. 92 The diffi-
culty with this division lies in the fact that Parliament came
to represent the people. In recognition of the dual sover-
eignty, courts in New York often reasoned, at least in theory,
that the Crown and Parliament could jointly extinguish the
public trust.93 Thus, the state, holding all sovereign powers,
could do the same. 94 Of course, this analysis converted a pub-
lic right into an alienable property interest, a conclusion at
odds with the basic tenet of the public trust doctrine that
some lands are not susceptible to private property ownership.
The judiciary has served as an uncertain defender of the non-
property interest in lands under water.
b. State Law Variations
There are three principal issues that affect the applica-
tion of the public trust doctrine. The first issue involves de-
termining what waters and lands are subject to the public
trust. The second issue is the scope of the protected trust in-
terests. The third issue is the extent to which a state may
alienate trust lands.
The majority rule, and the general rule in New York, 95
applies the trust doctrine to all waters which are navigable in
91. SLADE, supra note 85, at 15; JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS 6-7 (1994).
92. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 91 N.E. 846, 847
(N.Y. 1910).
93. People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521, 526-27 (N.Y. 1916); Peo-
ple v. New York and Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 77 (1877); Lansing v.
Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21 (N.Y. 1829). But see Coxe v. State, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (N.Y.
1895) (stating that Parliament and the King jointly could not extinguish the
public trust).
94. Although New York courts have sometimes broadly asserted the propo-
sition, an analysis of the holdings indicates that some limitations apply. See
infra parts III.A.3.ii.-iii.
95. See infra part III.A.3.a.
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fact, to all tidal waters, 96 and to the lands under tidal wa-
ters.9 7 The minority rule, which is followed in New Jersey,98
Massachusetts, 99 and Mississippi, 100 only applies the trust
doctrine to tidal waters. The majority of states, including
New York, apply the public trust rights to state waters ex-
tending from the former seaward limit of the territorial sea
(three nautical miles) to the mean high-tide line. 101 Seven
states apply the public trust only to lands seaward of the low-
tide line.10 2
In recent years, there has been an expansion beyond the
traditional boundaries of lands and waters subject to the pub-
lic trust. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the gen-
eral public must have reasonable access to the dry sand (non-
tidal) areas of municipal and quasi-municipal beaches. 03
The California Supreme Court has held that the state, as
trustee of its public trust lands, may regulate the use of non-
96. Tidal character, usually, is defined by the influence of the oceanic tide,
regardless of the salt content of the water. See SLADE, supra note 85, at 28. See
also People v. Tibbitts, 19 N.Y. 523, 526 (1859); Attorney General v. Woods, 108
Mass. 436, 439 (1871). In North Carolina, however, the state's highest court
held that the tide only refers to the ebb and flow of the sea, therefore, the tide
only extends as far as the salt water line. Collins v. Benbury,. 27 N.C. 118, 124
(1844).
97. ARCHER, supra note 91, at 15-16. The Supreme Court held that the
Great Lakes, although not tidal, were "navigable-in-fact" and, consequently,
were subject to the public trust. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-
36 (1892). See also infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (describing New
York rule concerning title to lands under navigable fresh water); SLADE, supra
note 85, at 25 (ownership of lands under trust waters).
98. Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 378 (1867).
99. Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 268, 270-272 (1826). See also
Trustees of Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 544, 546-548
(1852).
100. See Morgan and Harrison v. Redding, 11 Miss. 334 (1844); State ex rel.
Rice v. Stewart, 184 So. 44 (Miss. 1938).
101. ARCHER, supra note 91, at 15-16.
102. Id. These states are Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin.
103. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 471 A.2d 355, 363-66
(N.J. 1984) (indicating that the court also might recognize a public right to use
private dry sand beaches where necessary to protect public use of the shore
generally).
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navigable waters when such use affects public trust
waters. 104
The second issue is the scope of the protected public trust
doctrine interests. The core public trust uses are fishing,
commerce and navigation. 10 5 However, many other uses are
also recognized as protected public trust uses. 10 6 These in-
clude bathing, hunting, swimming, skating, cutting ice,
10 7
watering cattle, boating, and recreation.' 0 8
In recent years, several states have recognized the pres-
ervation of trust land in its natural state as a protected public
trust use. 109 Finally, at least three state courts have recog-
nized the right of the public to preserve trust lands and wa-
ters simply to preserve the scenic beauty of the area.110
The power of the state to alienate the trust is the most
divisive issue. Absolute conveyances of limited public trust
104. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d
709 (Cal. 1983).
105. ARCHER, supra note 91, at 23.
106. See, e.g., Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen)
158, 167 (1863) ("It would be scarcely be necessary to mention bathing, or the
use of the waters for washing, or watering cattle, preparation of flax, or other
agricultural uses, to all which uses a large body of water, devoted to the public
enjoyment, would usually be applied"); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821);
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358 ("The public's right to use the tidal lands and water
encompasses navigation, fishing and other recreational uses, including bathing,
swimming, and other shore activities."); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380
(Cal. 1971) (public trust easements include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim,
and to use for boating and general recreation).
107. See Cummings v. Barret, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 186, 188 (1852) (holding
that all ponds are public and are subject to reasonable uses including supplying
ice houses); Hartford v. Town of Gilmanton, 146 A.2d 851 (N.H. 1958) (public
trust interests include right to skate and cut ice).
108. But see Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989) (excluding
recreation as a recognized public trust right).
109. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d at 380; Saxon v. Division of State
Lands, 570 P.2d 1197 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the public interest is
better served by retaining a salt marsh in an unimproved, natural condition);
Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1158
(La. 1984) (stating that the Louisiana environmental regulatory framework is
based, to an extent, on the public trust doctrine).
110. These three states are California, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See
National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719
(Cal. 1983); Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976); State v. Trudeau, 408
N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 1987).
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lands to private parties are generally permissible, provided
the legislature expressly states its intent to extinguish the
public's interest, the conveyance was made for a valid public
purpose, and the affected lands are no longer suitable for
public trust uses.11' Some states recognize the conveyance of
small tracts of trust lands to private persons for purely pri-
vate purposes, 112 although such conveyances are contrary to
the basic trust doctrine. 113 One state suggests that the legis-
lature is powerless to divest public trust lands absolutely. 114
The public purpose used to validate conveyances of pub-
lic trust lands relates to the lands and waters remaining, and
not to any interest that would further the general common
good of the public. 1 5 In practice, however, the definition of
public purpose has also encompassed uses unrelated to the
water-related interests protected by the public trust
doctrine."16
c. Federal Law
The public trust doctrine is principally defined by state
law. A body of federal law, however, has developed in areas
where there is otherwise federal competence. Federal law de-
fines or limits the public trust doctrine under the Commerce
Clause, treaty law, United States territorial law, when exer-
111. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 606 (Me. 1981); City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362, 369 (Cal. 1980);
Opinion of the Justices, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100 (Mass. 1981).
112. See, e.g., People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1916).
113. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). Cf Steeple-
chase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521 (holding that a grant for beneficial enjoyment of
the upland owner for consideration conveyed absolute title without deciding
power of the legislature).
114. See Vermont v. Central Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Vt. 1989) (sug-
gesting that the legislature can grant no more than a fee simple conditional in
trust lands to protect the public interest, but holding that because the grant in
the instant case was conditional, the court need not decide if the legislature's
power is so limited).
115. People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 779-81 (Ill.
1976).
116. These uses include offshore oil production, Boone v. Kingsbury, 273 P.
797, 815-17 (Cal. 1928), and the assurance of marketability of title to structures
built on filled-in trust lands, Opinion of the Justices, 423 N.E.2d 751 (Mass.
1981).
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cising the power of eminent domain, upon the admission of
states into the Union, and where a state's construction of the
public trust gives rise to a claim by a property owner under
the federal constitution.
i. Commerce Clause
Under the Commerce Clause, the federal government
has regulatory jurisdiction over foreign trade and trade be-
tween the states. 117 In Gibbons v. Ogden, the United States
Supreme Court held that the authority over trade also con-
veyed to the United States jurisdiction over navigation. 118
Therefore, state sovereignty over navigable waters is subject
to federal regulation of navigation.11 9
All private property interests are subject to the federal
regulation of navigable waters. This limitation on property
interests is called the "navigational servitude." 120 Private
claims inconsistent with the exercise of the servitude are not
recognized.' 2 ' The Commerce Clause, therefore, limits state
and private interests in trust lands and waters rather than
defining the trust doctrine itself.
117. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
118. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
119. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
120. The navigational servitude generally relieves the government of the ob-
ligation to pay compensation when interfering with the private ownership of
riparian, littoral, or submerged lands which, if not for the fact that navigable
waters are involved, would require compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1991).
121. Id. See also, United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499
(1945) (no taking where alteration of river's level to improve navigation ad-
versely affected hydro-electric plant); Donnell v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 19
(D. Me. 1993) (no taking where Army Corps of Engineers suspended plaintiffs'
nationwide permit and suspension resulted in loss of a property interest recog-
nized under Maine law). Cf Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)
(holding that the United States could not require a public easement over waters
of a private marina under doctrine of navigational servitude without paying
compensation where marina created from a Hawaiian fishpond deemed fast
lands under Hawaiian law); accord Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489 (9th
Cir. 1991).
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ii. Treaty Law
In Summa Corp. v. California State Lands Commis-
sion,122 the Supreme Court construed the effect of federal pat-
ents conveying lands under the 1851 Act which settled land
claims between the United States and Mexico pursuant to the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 123 The Court held that Califor-
nia could not, in 1984, assert a public trust easement over
tidal lands because it had failed to assert the interest when
the land patents were settled.124 The Court refused to in-
quire into the Mexican law then in effect, holding, as a matter
of federal law, that the settlement of land claims under the
Treaty did not permit any reservations by implication.125
In sum, the Court held that the public trust interest of
California, a sovereign interest, was subject to the procedure
set forth in a federal statute to settle an obligation under in-
ternational law. The procedure to settle land claims, how-
ever, was silent as to the applicable substantive law. The
Court devised a rule of federal common law to displace the
state trust doctrine without inquiring whether either Mexi-
can law or principles of international law required such a
result.126
122. 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
123. Id. at 205. The Court acknowledged the principle that an ordinary fed-
eral patent purporting to convey tidelands located within a state to a private
individual is invalid, since the United States only holds such tidelands in trust
for the state. The federal patents issued in this case, however, were merely
confirmatory of Mexican patents. Id. According to the terms of the 1851 Act,
any claim adverse to a Mexican patent had to be presented within two years.
Id. at 203. The failure of California to timely assert an interest in the lands,
therefore, waived its claim of a public trust interest in the tidal lands. Id. at
209.
124. Summa Corp., 466 U.S. at 209.
125. Id. at 198.
126. The Court stated that the federal question before it was the interpreta-
tion of the 1851 Act. Id. at 201 n.1. If under applicable Mexican law, the Mexi-
can patents were subject to the public trust, the argument is weak that the
transfer of the sovereign interest to California somehow violated the obligation
of the United States to recognize the Mexican patents. The Court hints that a
reluctance to disrupt settled property expectations, while undertaking an un-
certain determination of 19th Century tidal boundaries and Mexican law, may
have influenced its decision. See Summa Corp. v. California State Lands
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iii. Eminent Domain
When the United States exercises the power of eminent
domain and takes public trust lands under the Fifth Amend-
ment,127 the issue raised is whether the taking extinguishes
the public trust. The applicable case law is inconclusive.
In United States v. 1.58 Acres,128 the district court held
that the United States may obtain fee simple title through
condemnation of public trust lands129 held by the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, subject, however, to the public
trust.130 The court found that in addition to acquiring title to
the submerged lands, the federal government also became
the substituted trustee of the public interest, an interest
which remained undiminished, although the state's interest
was wholly extinguished. 31 Key to the holding was the find-
ing that the United States, in its sovereign capacity, also
holds submerged lands subject to the public trust.
In United States v. 11.037 Acres,132 the United States ex-
ercised its power of eminent domain over filled tidal lands
that, under California law, had not lost their character as
trust lands. 133 The District Court for the Northern District of
California held that, under the Supremacy Clause, federal
eminent domain completely extinguished the state's public
trust easement. 34 The court expressly declined to follow
United States v. 1.58 Acres, which it misconstrued as holding
Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 201 n.1, 202 n.2 (1984) (noting that a recognition of
California's public trust interest could affect title to thousands of acres).
127. "[No] private property [shall] be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
128. 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981).
129. Id. at 120-21.
130. 523 F. Supp. at 120. Massachusetts follows the minority rule that pub-
lic trust lands do not include the intertidal shore, but extend seaward of the
mean low water mark. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
131. Id. at 124. "It must be recognized, however, that the federal govern-
ment is as restricted as the Commonwealth in its ability to abdicate to private
individuals its sovereign jus publicum in the land." Id. at 125.
132. 685 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
133. Id. Under California law, only the legislature can authorize the extin-
guishment of the trust by filling submerged lands. Id. at 216 (citing City of
Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1970)).
134. 685 F. Supp. at 217.
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that the state's public trust easement survived condemna-
tion. 13 5 The court did not consider whether the federal gov-
ernment took the lands subject to the trust doctrine as an
element of federal sovereignty, nor did the court say whether
the United States could extinguish the public trust in lands
which had not been filled. Also, the court's reasoning did not
suggest that the extinguishment of the public trust depended
upon a distinction between filled and unfilled public trust
lands.' 3 6 The court did not address City of Alameda v. Todd
Shipyards,13 7 an earlier case in which the Northern District
of California had followed United States v. 1.58 Acres.
In City of Alameda, one issue was whether the United
States could convey condemned trust lands to a private
party.' 3 8 The district court explicitly adopted the reasoning
of United States v. 1.58 Acres and held that the federal exer-
cise of eminent domain over tidal lands did not extinguish the
trust, but rather transferred the trust to the United
States. 39 The court modified the rule, however, by holding
that when the lands had been filled prior to the federal exer-
cise of eminent domain, then the United States took the lands
free from the public trust and could, therefore, convey them
to a private party.' 40
The rule in 1.58 Acres is that the public trust doctrine
applies to lands acquired by the United States through emi-
nent domain as a characteristic of federal sovereignty.
Although 11.037 Acres appears to reject this rule, it misstates
135. Id.
136. The court rightly acknowledged that the trust doctrine, under Califor-
nia law, could apply to filled lands. Id. at 216.
137. 635 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1986) [hereinafter Alameda III.
138. Id. at 1450.
139. Id.
140. Id. For an earlier decision in the same case, see City of Alameda v. Todd
Shipyard Corp., 632 F. Supp. 333 (1986) where the court applied California law
to the alienation of trust lands generally. Id. at 336-37. On rehearing, how-
ever, the court carved out the federal common law exception to California law.
635 F. Supp. at 1450. Under the exception, the federal exercise of eminent do-
main, after trust lands had been filled, extinguished the public trust in those
lands despite the fact that under California law, filling trust lands has no effect
on their character as trust lands. The court provides no rationale for its choice
of law.
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the holding and only denies, on the facts, that the federal gov-
ernment takes filled trust lands subject to the trust. City of
Alameda is consistent with both 1.58 Acres and 11.037 Acres.
City of Alameda approves of the rule in 1.58 Acres while in-
venting a federal common law rule that filled trust lands are
taken free of the trust. The cases may be harmonized by stat-
ing the rule as follows: the federal government takes trust
lands subject to the public trust, but it is not constrained by
the contours of a specific state doctrine, rather federal courts
may develop federal doctrine where uniformity or federal in-
terests are desirable. 141
iv. Admission of States into the Union
Federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the interest
granted to a newly admitted state, in addition to determining
what lands are granted to that state.142 The principle which
governs the determination is the equal footing doctrine. The
doctrine, in pertinent part, states: "The new states have the
same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over [submerged
141. The prevailing federal jurisprudence treats public trust doctrine as a
matter of state common law, see, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894),
however, where the federal government holds public trust lands in its sovereign
capacity, the application of only federal law to such lands is reasonable. Of
course, federal common law can adopt state law for most purposes. For exam-
ple, the boundary of trust lands varies under state law. In 1.58 Acres, under
Massachusetts law, the trust lands in question were below the low water mark.
If federal common law adopted the majority rule, that trust lands begin at the
mean high water mark, then the federal acquisition of lands in Massachusetts
might engraft a public easement over what were previously wholly private
lands. As a matter of public policy, therefore, federal common law might adopt
the law of the state to determine the bounds of the public trust lands, while
developing federal rules where uniformity is desirable, or perceived federal in-
terests are served. InAlameda, the court's rule concerning the effect of eminent
domain on previously filled lands presumably serves a perceived federal inter-
est. None, however, is articulated and the only apparent interest is marketable
title. The rule merely enabled the federal government to convert public trust
lands, under California law, into fee simple uplands through the exercise of
eminent domain.
142. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363, 369-70 (1976) (citing Borax, Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10
(1935)).
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lands] as the original states."143 In other words, "the federal
government holds title to the beds of navigable waterways in
trust for future States, to be granted to such States when
they enter the Union and assume sovereignty on an equal
footing with the established States."144 Barring a superior
federal interest, a newly admitted state is provided the
broadest jurisdiction over submerged lands as was found in
the original thirteen states; thereafter, the state is left to
shape its own public trust doctrine. 145
The federal policy of allowing states latitude in determin-
ing the limits of state jurisdiction over public trust lands is
illustrated by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi. 146 In
Phillips Petroleum, the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered whether states obtained title to tidal lands which were
neither navigable nor adjacent to a navigable waterway. The
issue was of first impression in Mississippi, 147 however, title
to the land in question had been held privately, and property
taxes paid upon it, since Mississippi was admitted into the
Union in 1817.148 The Court held that when Mississippi be-
came a state, it took title to all tidal lands regardless of
whether the surface waters, or adjacent surface waters, were
navigable in fact. 149
v. Claims Under the Federal Constitution
Federal interpretation of public trust doctrine has also
been shaped by landowners' constitutional claims. In Illinois
143. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845). Congress codified
this common law principle in 1953 with the passage of The Submerged Lands
Act. 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994).
144. Alaska v. United States, 754 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981)). Whether a particular
body of water is navigable for purposes of title is a federal question. Id.; Utah v.
United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671
F.2d 419 (11th Cir. 1982).
145. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 1. Local custom and territorial law may shape
the doctrine applicable to a state prior to its admission. Id. at 2.
146. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
147. Id. at 482.
148. Id. at 492 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 476.
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Central R.R. v. Illinois,150 the Court addressed the validity of
a legislative grant to a railroad company of over 1,000 acres
of submerged lands under Lake Michigan, comprising the
major part of the harbor of Chicago. 151 The Illinois Legisla-
ture rescinded the grant under subsequent legislation. The
railroad contended that the rescinding legislation violated
the Contracts Clause152 and the Due Process Clause153 of the
Constitution.
The Court upheld the rescinding legislation on the
grounds that the legislature was powerless to make an irrev-
ocable grant in the first place.'5 4 The Court noted that the
legislature could grant limited quantities of trust lands "for
the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or
when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the
public interest in what remains... - 155Aside from such lim-
ited grants, "[tihe control of the State for the purposes of the
trust can never be lost .... The State can no more abdicate
its trust over property in which the whole people are inter-
ested, like navigable waters and soils under them,.... than it
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of gov-
ernment and the preservation of the peace." 156 The original
grant, therefore, was a mere license, revocable by the
state.157
Illinois Central R.R. does not squarely address whether
it is federal or state law that limits the power of the legisla-
ture to alienate trust lands. 158 Presumably, the Court is de-
150. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
151. Id. at 454.
152. "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
153. "[N]o State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
154. 146 U.S. at 453-54.
155. Id. at 454.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 461-62. Divestment of the railroad's title and control of improve-
ments made in reliance upon the license, however, may be compensable. Id. at
455.
158. The Supreme Court has subsequently indicated, however, that the law
applied in Illinois Cent. R.R. was the state law of Illinois. Appleby v. City of
New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926). Certainly the state courts in Illinois have
77919961
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claring binding state law under the Supremacy Clause.
Under Contract Clause analysis, a federal court makes an in-
dependent determination of the state law that would other-
wise govern the threshold issue of whether a contract is
valid.' 59 The United States Supreme Court may even reverse
a state's highest court on a question of state law. 160 This ex-
traordinary review is deemed necessary to ensure federal
protection of the constitutional prohibition. 161 A rare exam-
ple of such a reversal is found in the public trust doctrine case
of Appleby v. City of New York. 162
The facts of Appleby are complex, involving a series of
valid regulations and enactments by New York City, New
York State, and the United States Secretary of War, concern-
ing title to submerged lands and placement of bulkhead
lines.16 3 In brief, the plaintiffs received a grant of submerged
lands for beneficial enjoyment with the authority to wharf out
to a bulkhead line approved by the Secretary of War, but
later moved inland by New York City. As a result, the west-
erly portion of the submerged lands became unavailable for
the construction of wharves. New York City, controlling the
adjacent piers, had commenced dredging the lands, while per-
mitting the mooring and docking of vessels on the surface wa-
ters. The plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin the dredging
and the use of the surface waters. The New York Court of
Appeals held that until the owner appropriated the sub-
merged lands by the erection of docks, title was held subject
followed the rule of Illinois Cent. R.R., see People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park
Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (1977), nonetheless, the Illinois Cent. Court does not cite
one Illinois case when deciding the public trust doctrine rule. 146 U.S. at 452-
62.
159. General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992).
160. The constitutional prohibition, however, only applies to state legislative
enactments and not to judicial decisions. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S.
444, 451 (1924). State courts can only be reversed in conclusions concerning the
effect of state legislation (whether it impairs a contract).
161. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938).
162. 271 U.S. 364 (1926) (rev'g 139 N.E. 474 (N.Y. 1923)).
163. For the following facts see Appleby, 192 N.Y.S. 211, 213-19 (App. Div.,
1st Dep't 1922).
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to public control of navigation; thus, the injunction was
denied.164
The Supreme Court conceded that state law controls the
City's right to use and regulate granted lands and surface
waters,165 characterizing the issue as "the extent of the power
of the State and city to part with property under navigable
waters to private persons, free from subsequent regulatory
control of the water over the land and the land itself."1
66 The
Court undertook an exhaustive survey of New York cases to
deduce that under New York law, within limits, 167 the state
may fully divest itself of the public interest in unappropriated
submerged lands, at least where the fee is granted for valua-
ble consideration. 168
164. Appleby, 139 N.E. 474, 476 (N.Y. 1923).
165. 271 U.S. at 380. The City's title to the submerged lands stems from
colonial grants and by state legislation. The City thus stands in the shoes of the
state and holds both the proprietary and sovereign title to the submerged lands.
Langdon v. Mayor of New York, 93 N.Y. 129, 143-45 (1883).
166. 271 U.S. at 380. The federal questions involved the effect of the Secre-
tary of War's bulkhead line, and the Contract Clause. Id. Thus, the power of
the legislature was directly before the Court. Cf People v. Steeplechase Park
Co., 113 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1916) (finding that the power of the legislature was not
before the court when determining if a beneficial grant contained a reservation
for public access).
167. The Court acknowledged limits under Coxe and Illinois Cent. R.R., but
noted that both cases admitted the right of the state to "surrender[ 1, alienate[ ],
or delegate[ ] [submerged lands] . . .for some public purpose, or some reason-
able use which can fairly be said to be for the public benefit." Id. at 395 (quot-
ing Coxe, 39 N.E. at 402 (citing Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387)).
168. 271 U.S. 364, 382-83, 400-03 (1926) (distinguishing People v. New York
& Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71 (1877)). New York & Staten Island Ferry
Co. held that legislation moving the pier line closer to shore prior to grantee's
construction of a pier over patented submerged lands was not a taking since
title was held subject to the sovereign's power to regulate navigation. Id. at 79.
The Supreme Court in Appleby held that the patent in New York & Staten Is-
land Ferry Co. was apparently a gift, and not for valuable consideration as in
Appleby. Appleby, 271 U.S. at 383.
With exasperating imprecision, the Appleby court opined that the city had
divested its public interest and "must be content with sailing over with boats as
it finds it [in its natural condition]." Id. at 400. Of course, sailing over the
lands is a public interest, an apparently retained interest which limits the hold-
ing, although not in a practical sense. If unable to dock vessels on the adjacent
piers, the core public trust interest, commercial navigation, is extinguished in
fact.
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The principal difficulty with Appleby is that the Supreme
Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals on a question
of state law that was of first impression. No prior Court of
Appeals case had decided whether the legislature could or did
alienate its control over public navigation, under a beneficial
grant for valuable consideration, where the grantee had not
appropriated the submerged lands by the construction of a
wharf.169 Consequently, the decision may be attacked on the
ground that the Supreme Court did not decide what the New
York law was, but what it believed was a better law. 170
169. The Supreme Court principally relied upon Langdon v. Mayor of New
York, 93 N.Y. 129; Williams v. Mayor of New York, 11 N.E. 829; and Steeple-
chase. All three cases involved grants for valuable consideration where the
lands had been appropriated. Steeplechase only interpreted the grant and ex-
plicitly does not reach the issue of the legislature's power. See infra notes 235-
47 and accompanying text.
170. The Court stated that it made an independent determination, regard-
less of whether the question was governed by "issues of general or purely local
[New York] law." Appleby, 271 U.S. at 380. Although the Court only cited New
York cases, the decision may have been influenced by the Court's suggestion
that its independent determination might consider "general" legal principles.
For example, in a circuitous manner, the Court seems to find that the federal
government's establishment of the bulkhead line somehow concludes the City's
sovereign control of patented lands within the federal boundary. Id. at 401-402
(arguing that City had conveyed the right to build bulkheads or piers along
with submerged lands somehow shown by analyzing the effect of the federal
action). "General" federal common law was repudiated by Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Indeed, the competence of the Court under the
Commerce Clause is questionable. The Court stated that it was construing the
effect of state legislation affecting the bulkhead line and pier locations. Ap-
pleby, 271 U.S. at 380-81. In fact, the entire decision concerned what property
interest New York conveyed to the plaintiffs, a question of common law nor-
mally not reviewable under the Contract Clause. See supra note 160.
The application of the Contract Clause to land grants is suspect in any
case. See Douglas W. Kmiec and John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A
Return to the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 539-40(1987). Strict application of the Contract Clause to land grants would prohibit
all legislative and common law development of private property rights, includ-
ing zoning, nuisance, and pollution laws. If states utilize public trust doctrine
to exert control over water related resources, limitations on private interests
may be subject to federal oversight under takings and Contract Clause analy-
ses. Such oversight could freeze the common law development of public trust
doctrine in favor of private property rights. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding that coastal zone regulations
that render private property valueless a taking unless justifiable under tradi-
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3. Public Trust Doctrine in New York
a. Scope of the Public Trust Interest
In New York, the public trust doctrine applies to sub-
merged lands and surface waters. 171 The application to sub-
merged lands results in a restriction on private use, whereas
the application to surface waters permits public use. In
either case, the doctrine protects the right of the public to use
surface waters for navigation.
Public trust lands in New York include all lands washed
by the tides and certain lands under navigable non-tidal wa-
ters. Unless previously granted, title to all lands subject to
the tide is vested in the state. 172 Title to lands under fresh
water depends upon the status of the water body.173 Where
rivers and lakes form the boundaries of the state, title to the
submerged lands beneath them is vested in the state.' 74 In
addition, title to the lands beneath the Mohawk River and
the non-tidal upper Hudson River is also vested in the
state. 75 Title to all other purely intrastate rivers, streams,
ponds, and smaller lakes is presumptively vested in the adja-
cent upland owners.176 Title to large intrastate lakes with a
history of public navigation may be vested in the state.
77
tional state nuisance law, suggesting that innovations in state nuisance law
would result in a taking).
171. John A. Humbach, Public Rights in the Navigable Streams of New York,
6 PACE ENvrL. L. REv. 461, 465-66 (1989). For a comprehensive summary of
case and statutory law concerning the public interest in navigable waters in
New York, see id.
172. See Coxe v. State, 39 N.E. 400 (N.Y. 1895). As with all coastal states,
New York's jurisdictional limit is three miles. See supra note 101 and accompa-
nying text.
173. The terminology is not exclusive because some tidal water, such as the
upper Hudson River, is fresh although subject to tides.
174. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 94 N.E. 199, 202-03 (N.Y.
1911).
175. Id. at 202.
176. See id. at 203 (streams); and Waters of White Lake, Inc. v. Fricke, 123
N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1953) (ponds and lakes).
177. The division between state owned and riparian owned lakes is uncer-
tain and case specific. Granger v. City of Canandaigua, 177 N.E. 394, 396 (N.Y.
1931). The Court of Appeals has held that the state holds title to Lake Canan-
daigua, id.; and Lake George, People v. System Properties, Inc., 141 N.E.2d 429
(N.Y. 1957). The courts have also avoided deciding the issue. See City of Ge-
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Beyond navigation, the scope of protected public inter-
ests turns on the ownership of the submerged lands and the
historic patterns of use. 178 Public rights are most restricted
where navigable-in-fact waters lie over non-trust lands. 179
Although these waters are subject to an easement for public
navigation, any other public interest is questionable. 180
Where trust lands are granted to the upland owner, the pub-
lic retains the right to fish and navigate over the granted
lands.' 8 1 The broadest public rights are in waters above trust
lands held by the sovereign. These rights include navigation,
swimming, bathing, fishing, hunting and recreation. 8 2
neva v. Henson, 95 N.E. 1125 (N.Y. 1911) (regarding Seneca Lake); Stewart v.
Turney, 197 N.Y.S. 81 (App. Div., 4th Dep't 1922) (regarding Lake Cayuga).
Former Associate Judge William S. Andrews of the New York Court of Appeals
suggested a system based upon size and use to determine the title to lake beds,
see William S. Andrews, Lands Under Water in New York, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 277
(1931), that the Court of Appeals seemed to approve in Granger, 117 N.E. at
396.
178. In England, the common law source of the doctrine in the United States,
tidal and navigable in fact waters were essentially synonymous. The navigabil-
ity-in-fact test in the United States was an innovation arising from the presence
of major non-tidal lakes and rivers typically used in commerce. See Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336-38 (1876).
The traditional test of navigability is whether the surface water has a his-
tory of navigation for commercial purposes. Navigation includes the use of the
stream for transporting logs, provided the stream was capable of floating logs in
its natural state. The test has recently been broadened. Use of a stream on a
single occasion for recreational purposes, such as canoeing, may result in a find-
ing that the stream is navigable in fact, even where the occasional portage is
required. See Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788
(App. Div., 3d Dep't 1994).
179. Where the riparian owner presumptively holds title to the stream or
lake bed.
180. See Andrews, supra note 177, at 277.
181. Slingerland v. International Contracting Co., 61 N.E. 995, 998 (N.Y.
1901) (holding that the state is powerless to grant exclusive fishing rights to
tidal portion of the Hudson River). Shellfishing rights, however, may be
granted or implied in a grant of submerged lands because the shellfish are at-
tached to the granted land. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); Lewis
Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 91 N.E. 846 (N.Y. 1910).
182. See Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, 105 N.E. 849 (N.Y. 1914)
(navigation); Stewart v. Turney, 197 N.Y.S. 81 (App. Div., 4th Dep't 1922)
(hunting); Adirondack League Club, Inc., 615 N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. Div., 3d Dep't
1994) (recreation); Barnes v. Midland R. Terminal Co., 85 N.E. 1093 (N.Y. 1908)
(bathing, fishing, boating). These interests have been given some statutory pro-
tection. See infra note 200.
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b. Grants of Lands Under Water
i. Statutory History
In 1786, the legislature created the Board of Land Com-
missioners (Board) to facilitate the distribution and sale of
state lands.18 3 In relevant part, the act authorized the Board
to grant submerged lands beneath "navigable rivers, as the
[Board] shall deem necessary to promote the commerce of this
State."18 4 The act restricted grants to the owners of the adja-
cent uplands.18 5 The lands that the Board was authorized to
convey increased to include lands underlying navigable
lakes, 86 the Hudson River across from New Jersey, 8 7 and
submerged lands both around Long Island and along the
coast of Westchester County.'8 8 The Board was also given
183. Act of May 5, 1786, ch. 67, 1786 N.Y. Laws 334. The Board consisted of
the governor, the lieutenant governor, the speaker of the assembly, the secre-
tary of state, the attorney general, the treasurer, and the state auditor (comp-
troller). Id. Over the years, the composition of the Board was altered. The
state surveyor became a Board member. See Act of Apr. 6, 1813, ch. 74, § 1,
1813 N.Y. Laws 292, 292 (providing that the state surveyor and at least two
other commissioners would constitute a quorum). In 1962, submerged lands
were placed under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of general services. The
statute was altered to provide the commissioner with the powers previously
held by the Board. Act of Apr. 19, 1962, 643, 1962 N.Y. Laws 2917. For pur-
poses of consistency, the term Board will be used in this comment, notwith-
standing that, after 1962, the powers of the Board were vested in the
commissioner.
184. 1786 N.Y. Laws at 338.
185. Id. The statute still restricts grants or leases of submerged lands to the
upland owner, with certain exceptions. The Board may convey jurisdiction of
state owned lands to other state agencies for the "purpose of protecting environ-
mentally sensitive lands," regardless of who owns the appurtenant uplands.
N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(a) (McKinney 1993). See also infra note 189 (re-
garding leases to non-upland owners). The restriction does not apply to rail-
roads, who receive lands under separate statutory provisions. See infra partIII.A.3.b.ii.
186. N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAw § 67 (Packard and Van Benthuysen 1829).
187. Id. § 68 (subject to the prior rights of New York City).
188. Act of May 6, 1835, ch. 232, 1835 N.Y. Laws 276 (codified at N.Y. Pub.
L. Law § 75(6) (McKinney 1993) (excluding lands within New York City). The
submerged lands surrounding New York City had originally been devised to the
city under colonial grants, subsequently affirmed by the legislature. Langdon v.
Mayor of New York, 93 N.Y. 129, 134-38 (1883).
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the discretion to make grants for a period of years (leases)
and lesser interests. s8 9
Amendments affecting the Board's power reflect a con-
flicted policy of promoting economic development while pre-
serving a public interest in trust lands. For example, one
amendment authorized the Board to convey to the holder of
patented submerged lands all remaining interest the state
may have in the lands. 190 Such a conveyance settled title and
encouraged development. Somewhat inconsistently, the
Board was admonished to impose conditions on such a con-
veyance as will protect the interests of the state.19 1 Where
other grants require prior public notice, 92 a grant under this
provision, purportedly extinguishing any remaining interest
held by the state, is exempt from public notice
requirements. 193
In 1835, the use of tidal lands was limited to the erection
of docks to promote water borne commerce.1 94 No case law
successfully enforced the restriction, however, and it was re-
pealed by 1909.195 In 1850, the Board was empowered to
189. N.Y. Pus. LANDS LAw § 75(6) (McKinney 1953) ("The [Board] may grant
in perpetuity or otherwise.... ."). The statute now permits the Board to make
"grants, leases, easements, and lesser interests, including permits... ." N.Y.
PuB. LANDS LAw § 75 (McKinney 1993). The most recent innovation allows the
Board to make leases, with the consent of the upland owner, with any party.
Act of Aug. 2, 1994, ch. 703, § 2, 1994 N.Y. Laws 1722, 1722-23 (codified at N.Y.
PuB. LANDS LAw § 75(7)(a) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1995)).
190. Act of Apr. 6, 1949, ch. 595, 1949 N.Y. Laws 1360 (codified at N.Y. PUB.
LANDS LAw § 75(11) (McKinney 1993).
191. Id.
192. N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAw § 77 (McKinney 1993). The notice requirement
dates from 1786. Act of May 5, 1786, ch. 67, 1786 N.Y. Laws 334, 338.
193. N.Y. PuB. LANDs LAw § 75(11) (McKinney 1993). Grants of lands below
non-navigable waters are also exempt from notice requirements. Id. § 75(12).
194. Act of May 6, 1835, ch. 232, 1835 N.Y. Laws 276 (for a subsequent his-
tory, see infra note 195) ('This act... shall confer upon the [Board] no other
power than to authorize the erection of such dock or docks, as [it] shall deem
necessary to promote the commerce of this state, and the collection of [fees]
from persons using such dock or docks . . ").
195. N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAw § 111 (J. B. Lyon Co. 1909) (referring to annexed
Schedule of Laws Repealed, at page 3177 (repealing Laws of 1835 ch. 232)).
The restriction is also omitted from N.Y. PuB. LANDs LAw § 70 (Banks and
Brothers 1896), but appears in N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAw §§ 67-71 (Banks and
Brothers 1889) as an addendum to those sections; See also N.Y. PuB. LANDs
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make grants "for the purpose of beneficial enjoyment."196 A
restriction incorporated in 1894 prohibited grants that inter-
fered with the rights of the Hudson River Railroad
Company. 197
Although the Board frequently conditioned grants of land
to protect public interests, 198 the statute was silent on the is-
sue for over one hundred years. In 1917, however, the Board
was required to periodically investigate whether conditions to
grants, that had a fixed time for compliance, had been met by
the grantee. 199 It was not until the amendments of 1992 that
the Board was directed to protect the public interest in sub-
merged lands.200
LAW § 84 (Banks and Brothers 1875) and N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAw § 84 (Banks and
Brothers 1859). The Court of Appeals stated that the restriction was repealed
by the amendment to the Public Lands Law, Act of Apr. 10, 1850, ch. 283, 1850
N.Y. Laws 621, that permitted conveyances for beneficial enjoyment. In re
Water Front on Upper New York Bay, 157 N.E. 911 (N.Y. 1927). Neither the
language of the amendment, nor the statutory history, offers any support for
the court's assertion. The subsequent authorization for beneficial enjoyment
grants is not inconsistent with application of the restriction to non-beneficial
enjoyment grants. Lacking other evidence, it can be concluded that the restric-
tion was repealed between 1889 and 1894. See also infra notes 221-23 and ac-
companying text for an analysis of the judicial interpretation of the restriction.
196. Act of Apr. 10, 1850, ch. 283, 1850 N.Y. Laws 621. Agriculture was in-
cluded as a permitted use under the Public Lands Law, 1909 N.Y. PUB. LANDS
LAw § 75(4) (J.B. Lyon Co. 1909).
197. N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAw § 70 (Banks and Brothers 1896).
198. See, e.g., Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal, 85 N.E. 1093 (N.Y. 1908)
(grant prohibiting obstruction of public access along the shore).
199. Act of May 2, 1917, ch. 308, 1917 N.Y. Laws 1053 (current version at
N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAw § 78 (McKinney 1993)) (requiring the attorney general to
commence actions to annul grants where the conditions had not been fulfilled).
See also N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAw § 75(7)(g)(ii) (Board to take enforcement action
against lessees, easement holders, or permittees in violation of conditions, or
refer to the attorney general, at the request of the Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation).
200. Act of Aug. 7, 1992, ch. 791 § 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 2168, 2169 (codified at
N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAw § 75(7)(a) (McKinney 1993)) ("the commissioner shall,
upon administrative findings, and to the extent practicable, reserve such inter-
ests or attach such conditions to preserve the public interest in the use of state-
owned lands underwater and waterways for navigation, commerce, fishing,
bathing, recreation, environmental protection and access to the navigable wa-
ters of the state. . . ."). See also N.Y. Pun. LANDS LAw §§ 75(7)(b), (c), (f) (con-
taining provisions to protect the public interest in submerged lands).
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ii. Railroad Grants
The Hudson River Railroad Company20 ' was formed
under legislative authorization in 1846.202 The act author-
ized the railroad to lay out its line, take possession of neces-
sary lands and waters, and to construct its road along the
eastern shore of the Hudson River. 203 Although the act pro-
vided the means and authority for the railroad to take posses-
sion of public property, 20 4 the act did not authorize the
railroad to take title to lands under water,20 5 nor did the act
purport to convey any such lands.20 6 After the railroad was
constructed, its interest in the submerged lands, therefore,
was in the nature of an implied license until it obtained
grants from the Board. 20 7
Under the General Railroad Act of 1850,208 all railroads
formed under, or prior to the act, were authorized to obtain
grants of public lands.20 9 The act failed to mention any right
of the railroads to obtain submerged lands in particular.
Nonetheless, the New York Court of Appeals construed the
act as authorizing the Board to convey submerged lands to
railroads, notwithstanding that they are not owners of the
adjacent uplands, because any other interpretation would
frustrate the purpose of the act.210 The grants, however, do
not cut off the rights of upland owners. Submerged lands
201. The Hudson River Railroad was consolidated with the New York Cen-
tral in 1869 to form the New York Central & Hudson River Railway Company.
New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Aldridge, 32 N.E. 50 (N.Y. 1892).
202. Act of May 12, 1846, ch. 216, § 1, 1846 N.Y. Laws 272, 276, amended by
Act of Feb. 10, 1848, ch. 30, 1848 N.Y. Laws 39.
203. Act of May 12, 1846, ch. 216, §§ 1, 4, 9-13, 1846 N.Y. Laws 272, 272-79;
Act of Feb. 10, 1848, ch. 30 §§ 1-4, 1848 N.Y. Laws 39, 39-43.
204. Act of May 12, 1846, ch. 216, §§ 9-13, 1846 N.Y. Laws 272, 275-79; Act
of Feb. 10, 1848, ch. 30 §§ 1-5, 1848 N.Y. Laws 39, 39-43.
205. The Board was generally prohibited from conveying submerged lands
except to the adjacent upland owner. See infra note 358 and accompanying
text.
206. Aldridge, 32 N.E. at 51.
207. Id.
208. Act of Apr. 2, 1850, ch. 140, 1850 N.Y. Laws 211.
209. Id. §§ 25, 49, 1850 N.Y. Laws 211, 223, 235.
210. Saunders v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 38 N.E. 992, 995
(N.Y. 1894).
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that the railroad lawfully fills do not become uplands with
attached riparian rights.211
The successor in interest to the Hudson River Railroad
Company, The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad
Company, acquired the lands under water belonging to the
State of New York under letters patent in 1873.212 This om-
nibus patent referenced the survey maps filed with the sev-
eral counties through which the railroad passed.213 The
language of the patent conveys unrestricted title, however,
the courts have construed the railroad's title in harmony with
applicable statutes and common law to limit title to some-
thing in the nature of an easement. 214 The consideration was
also nominal, $500.00 for approximately 60% of the eastern
shore of the river.
The state subsequently granted other parcels to the rail-
road for right-of-way realignments, additional tracks, appur-
tenant uses (yards and stations), and to correct discrepancies
between the filed maps and the actual locations. The lan-
guage in later grants varies. The most restrictive language
provides for revocation at will by the state.215
Title to lands on the west shore of the Hudson River were
conveyed by statute and by letters patent to the West Shore
211. In re Buffalo, 99 N.E. 850 (N.Y. 1912).
212. New York State Letters Patent, Book 42, pages 690-92 (Dec. 26, 1873).
213. Westchester (Bronx County, along the Hudson River, was part of West-
chester County at the time of the patent) Putnam, Dutchess, Columbia, and
Rensselaer Counties. The original maps should still be on file with the respec-
tive counties. A complete duplicate set of maps was filed with the state and are
in the possession of the Office of Government Services, Division of Land Utiliza-
tion, in Albany. These maps are made of linen and are as long as 100 feet,
representing the first systematic survey of the east shore of the Hudson River.
As such, they are the basis for determining the shoreline for subsequent grants
of lands underwater and are the starting point for the several efforts (none com-
pleted) to establish the change in the modern shoreline (with consequent title
implications).
214. Grants of submerged lands to the railroads convey a limited fee for use
as a railroad. Aldridge, 32 N.E. at 54.
215. New York State Letters Patent, Book 47, page 570 (May 16, 1913) (con-
veying additional lands in the Town of Stockport, Columbia County, as shown
on Land Under Water Map 7). There is nothing special about these lands to
explain the reservation. Specific language may have been politically motivated
(by, for example, an unhappy riparian with connections in Albany).
7891996]
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Railroad Company.2 16 Title to underwater lands in Rockland
County was conveyed by statute.217 The statute of 1865 spe-
cifically reserved riparian rights.21 8 The letters patent issued
for Orange and Ulster Counties were in the nature of quit-
claim deeds, reserving any rights previously granted and gold
and silver mines to the state.219 No consideration was paid
for any of the grants examined by the author.220 The reserva-
tions of existing rights and riparian interests, the complete
lack of monetary consideration, as well as the general body of
railroad law, point to the conclusion that the railroad essen-
tially received an easement.
c. Limitations on Fee
Public trust doctrine raises issues of title that confound
principles of property law. The state holds title, but that title
is neither absolute nor defeasible. Determination of title to
public trust lands involves principles of property law and
principles of state sovereignty. To the extent that absolute
title to trust lands is vested in the public as a whole, the state
holds title as a trustee, and conveyances may not violate the
terms of the trust. Put another way, the state's authority
over trust lands is sovereign and proprietary. Although the
state may convey its proprietary interest, the state cannot
contract away or abdicate its sovereignty. This principle of
sovereignty is not constitutional, but an intrinsic attribute of
government. Nonetheless, trust lands have been conveyed.
The courts dislike incomplete title and, consequently, judicial
limitations on fee are rare.
216. The railroad was also known as the New York West Shore Railroad
Company; and, the New York, West Shore and Buffalo Railroad Company. The
line was purchased by the New York Central Railroad. For a short history of
the West Shore line see ADAMs, supra note 5, at 211-15.
217. The state conveyed the lands shown on a map filed with the Secretary of
State. Act of Apr. 24, 1865, ch. 556, 1865 N.Y. Laws 1121; Act of June 18, 1886,
ch. 601, 1886 N.Y. Laws 858.
218. Act of Apr. 24, 1865, ch. 556, § 1, 1865 N.Y. Laws 1121, 1121-22.
219. The railroad was obliged to purchase any submerged lands previously
granted by the state to the adjacent upland owners.
220. The principle grant is located in the New York State Letters Patent,
Book 40, pp. 314-29 (Feb. 16, 1882).
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i. Purpose of Grant / Actions to Annul
The owner of public trust lands may use them for any
purpose not otherwise restricted by law or the language of
the grant. Violation of the terms of the grant, fraud, or fail-
ure to vest title pursuant to a condition subsequent, may give
rise to an action by the state attorney general to challenge
the validity of the grant.221 Such an action is limited, how-
ever, by the statute of limitations applicable to adverse pos-
session.222 If the attorney general "has good reason to
believe" that the patent can be annulled, then he "must"
bring the action.223 Since the duty is mandatory, a private
party may petition the court to compel the attorney general to
221. N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAW § 138 (McKinney 1993). An action to quiet title or
ejectment based upon the theory that another grant is invalid is improper un-
less the grant in question is invalid on its face. E.G. Blackslee Manufacturing
Co. v. E.G. Blackslee's Sons Ironworks, 29 N.E. 2 (N.Y. 1891) (holding that a
grant valid on its face may not be attacked collaterally). The grant at question
in Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton Street Realty Corp., 5 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y.
1936), may provide an example of a grant void on its face. The court found, in a
collateral attack, that a colonial grant was void as against public policy. Id. at
826. See infra notes 262-63 & accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
The dissent argued that the validity of the colonial grant should not be reached
on the grounds, inter alia, of the collateral attack rule in Blackslee. 5 N.E. at
829 (O'Brien, J. dissenting). The majority did not address the issue, perhaps
finding that the grant was void on its face.
222. People v. Clarke, 9 N.Y. 349 (1850). See also M.R.M. Realty Co. v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 280 N.Y.S. 22 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1935) (New York
City grantor would be barred by statute of limitations from enforcing grantee's
covenant to construct a wharf at any time City so directed); People v. New York
Transit & Terminal Co., 195 N.Y.S. 305 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (holding that an action
to void grant on grounds grantee not upland proprietor barred by statute of
limitations); People v. Havemeyer & Elder, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 249 (Sup. Ct. 1933)
(action to void grant for failure to comply with condition subsequent within a
fixed time barred by statute of limitations). The applicable statute of limita-
tions is twenty years. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 211(c). In Marba Sea Bay, 5
N.E.2d 824, the issue of the statute of limitations did not arise. If the statute
did apply, it would bar a direct action to void the grant. Nonetheless, the court
voided the grant in a collateral action brought to determine title. Marba Sea
Bay suggests, therefore, that if a plaintiff can overcome the collateral attack
rule, the statute of limitations will not apply. See supra note 221.
223. N.Y. PuB. LANDs LAW § 138 (emphasis added).
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bring the action.224 Alternately, the state may bring an ac-
tion on behalf of an interested party.225
ii. Language of Grant
The principal distinction among grants of lands under
water is whether they are for "commercial purposes" or for
"beneficial enjoyment."226 As the terms are not defined in the
statute, the applicable law construing these terms has been
developed judicially.
The courts have been inconsistent in construing the
"commercial purposes" language. A first group of cases hold
that the language, at least when coupled with a condition
that docks are erected on the submerged lands, prohibits the
owner from excluding public use of the premises. 227 Other
cases hold that the "commercial purposes" language imposes
no public use restriction on the grant, regardless of whether
the grant requires the erection of docks. 228 These second
224. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7801 (article 78 proceedings).
225. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 1302. One court assumes in dicta that only
the state has power to revoke a grant under letters patent. Smith v. State, 545
N.Y.S.2d 203 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1989).
226. Other specific conditions may apply. See generally supra part III.A.3.b.
227. Thousand Island Steamboat Co. v. Visger, 71 N.E. 764 (N.Y. 1904);
Harper v. Williams, 18 N.E. 77 (N.Y. 1888).
228. In re Water Front on Upper New York Bay, 157 N.E. 911 (N.Y. 1927)
(holding that the "commercial purposes" and erection of docks language in
grant permits grantee to build private docks and warehouses, cert. denied, 276
U.S. 626 (1928); Abbot v. Curran, 98 N.Y. 665 (1885) (holding that commercial
purposes language imposes no restriction on absolute title).
Efforts by the attorney general to enforce grants, apparently limited to the
use of docks, met with a baffled response from the lower courts. In People v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 148 N.Y.S. 160 (Sup. Ct. 1914), the attorney gen-
eral brought an action to vacate letters patent on the grounds that the grantee
had violated the terms by erecting factory buildings of up to ten stories on the
lands. The patents were conditioned upon the grantee erecting docks and ap-
plying the premises to commerce. The court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim. The court noted that docks had been constructed and that the
premises were applied to commerce, therefore, no violation of the terms of the
patents were alleged. Neither the court, nor possibly the complaint, addressed
the statutory restriction. All the letters patent were issued between 1868 and
1884, while the restriction appears to have been in force. At first glance, the
case may have been decided merely upon an error in the pleading, however, the
attorney general was insistent and presumably amended his complaint when
he sued again. He fared no better, however, the second round. People v. Ameri-
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cases, however, contain errors which weaken their author-
ity.229 Nonetheless, the most recent case by the Court of Ap-
peals to address the issue, In re Water Front on Upper New
York Bay, provides the rule that a grant for commercial pur-
poses conveys unrestricted title, subject to state control of
navigation.23 0 If a grant, however, contains language pur-
porting to restrict the use of the submerged lands to the erec-
tion of docks for the purpose of commerce, then a condition
subsequent is imposed, but the condition does not carry any
public right of use.23 1 As the rule stands, the public does not
necessarily lose use of filled lands where there is historic pub-
lic use.23 2
The general rule applied to grants for beneficial enjoy-
ment is that such grants convey the entire interest that the
state has in the submerged lands.233 However, there remains
can Sugar Refining Co., 163 N.Y.S. 456 (Sup. Ct. 1917), af/d 169 N.Y.S. 386
(App. Div., 2d Dep't 1918). The second opinion was lengthier, discussing the
relation of docks to commerce, but again no reference was made to the statutory
restriction, nor was it mentioned on the unsuccessful appeal. 169 N.Y.S. 386.
229. In re Water Front relies, in part, on the apparently mistaken finding
that the statutory restriction limiting the use of the premises to erecting docks
for public use was repealed in 1850. 157 N.E. at 915. See supra notes 195-96.
Abbot, is a memorandum decision holding, without analysis, that grants of sub-
merged lands carry neither a condition subsequent nor a restriction. 98 N.Y.
665, 668 (1885). Abbot, however, cites for authority a line of cases that begin
with, and rely upon, Craig v. Wells, 11 N.Y. 315 (1854). Craig v. Wells, how-
ever, is inapplicable. The case holds that a covenant in a deed, in favor of a
third party, is void. Id. at 323. Obviously a grant from the state, as trustee,
does not fall afoul of the rule when it imposes a restriction in favor of the people
of the state.
230. 157 N.E. 911, 917 (N.Y. 1927).
231. In re Water Front on Upper New York Bay, 157 N.E. 911, 917 (N.Y.
1927). The court states that if a grant is subject to the condition subsequent
that the premises be applied to commercial purposes, the erection of private
wharves and warehouses satisfy the condition.
232. See infra part III.C.2 (concerning points of public access). Where grants
are for commercial purposes, a history of public use may engraft a public right
to use private wharves. See Thousand Island Steamboat Co. v. Visger, 71 N.E.
764 (N.Y. 1904) (discussing the history of prior public use of a wharf); Harper v.
Williams, 18 N.E. 77 (N.Y. 1888) (discussing the history of public use after the
construction of a wharf). Cf Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gas Light Co., 42 N.Y. 384
(1870) (holding that no right of public use was implied where there never was
any public use in fact).
233. In re Water Front, 157 N.E. at 914-15 (citing People v. Steeplechase
Park Co., 113 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1916)). The state legislature implicitly concurred
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a possibility that the state may void a grant for beneficial en-
joyment that reserves the public use of the lands until the
beneficial enjoyment is "appropriated" by the grantee.234
A beneficial grant can fully extinguish the public trust
interest, or non-proprietary interest, of the state, provided
that the grant is not of such magnitude as to run afoul of the
proscription in Coxe v. State.235 "The question .. is largely
one of degree."23 6
The principal case construing an unrestricted grant for
beneficial enjoyment is People v. Steeplechase Park Co.237 At
issue was whether a private amusement park in Coney Is-
land could appropriate the tidal shore of the Atlantic Ocean,
completely blocking public access along the beach. The park
was built upon several grants. All but one grant reserved
public access to the tidal lands. The court affirmed, without
discussion, the order of the court below that required the re-
moval of the obstructions from those grants which reserved
the public right of access. 238 The court held that the one
grant which contained no restrictions was for beneficial en-
joyment and extinguished the public trust interest in the ap-
propriated lands. 239 Despite the strong language, there are
several aspects to the decision that qualify it.
The weight of the authority of Steeplechase, and the
breadth of its holding, are not conclusive as to the power of
the legislature to extinguish the public trust. The decision
with the court's interpretation. See Act of Apr. 16, 1949, ch. 595, § 3, 1949 N.Y.
Laws 1360, 1362 (amending Public Lands Law by adding subsection 11 which
authorized the Board to convey to grantees, who had received a lesser interest
than beneficial enjoyment, all remaining interest held by the state). The 1949
act expresses a legislative opinion that where grants are not for beneficial en-
joyment, the state retains an interest in the lands.
234. Smith v. State, 545 N.Y.S.2d 203, 204 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1989). How
the grantee would appropriate beneficial enjoyment is unclear.
235. 39 N.E. 400 (N.Y. 1895); See infra part III.A.3.c.iii.
236. Steeplechase, 113 N.E. at 527 (Bartlett, C.J., concurring in the result).
237. 113 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1916) (4-3 decision).
238. Id. at 521 (affg 143 N.Y.S. 503 (Sup. Ct. (1913)), affd 151 N.Y.S. 157
(App. Div., 2d Dep't 1914).
239. Steeplechase, 113 N.E. at 526-27.
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commanded a bare majority,240 and the opinion only a plural-
ity.241 The opinion quotes, with approval, the principle that
such grants are permissible if they are in the public interest,
or at least, not injurious to the public. 242 Factually, however,
the grant allowed an amusement park to block public beach
access in Coney Island. No possible public interest, under
traditional land use planning or public trust doctrine, is fur-
thered by allowing this use, and it is clearly injurious to the
public use of the remaining shore.243
The opinion was restricted, however, to a construction of
the intent of the legislature when granting a fee for beneficial
enjoyment. 244 The opinion stated that the issue of whether
the legislature acted beyond its power was not before it.245
The decision, therefore, can be limited to the posture of the
case. No reservation will be implied in a grant for beneficial
enjoyment, for consideration, that will provide the grounds
for an injunction to permit public access to the foreshore.246
A court could still find such an unequivocal grant beyond the
power of the legislature without overruling Steeplechase.247
240. Four judges voted to reverse the order below enjoining the obstructions,
while three judges voted to affirm the order. The judges that dissented included
Associate Judge Benjamin Cardozo, later a justice of the United States
Supreme Court. Id. at 528.
241. Steeplechase, 113 N.E. at 527. The Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals concurred in the result, but wrote separately to limit the holding to
the fact that only a "few hundred feet" of the shore was involved. Id. (Bartlett,
C.J., concurring).
242. 113 N.E. at 526 (quoting In re Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy,
105 N.E. 849, 851 (N.Y. 1915)).
243. After stating the non-injury rule, the court makes no attempt to apply it
to the instant facts. The court simply states that "the propriety or validity of
the grant is not attacked in this action." 113 N.E. at 526.
244. Id. at 526-27.
245. Id. at 527 (noting that a patent for submerged lands could not be voided
in a collateral attack).
246. Any such grant, however, is still subordinate to the federal power to
regulate navigation. Id.
247. One lower court was so incensed by Steeplechase that in dicta, the court
said that despite the controlling precedent, it would not follow it. Aquino v.
Riegelman, 171 N.Y.S. 716, 718 (Sup. Ct. 1918), affd on other grounds, 173
N.Y.S. 917 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1919) (stating "I must respectfully refuse to
follow [Steeplechase] .... I deny that the Legislature has the power.., to give
or grant to any person rights which are the property of all the citizens of this
commonwealth .... ").
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In Appleby v. City of New York, 248 the United States
Supreme Court extended Steeplechase. In Steeplechase, the
grantee had improved the property inconsistently with public
access. 249 In Appleby, the submerged lands had not been fil-
led, nonetheless, the Court found that absolute title had
passed to the grantee. 250 Under Appleby and Steeplechase,
the settled rule is that, under certain circumstances, the
state cannot interfere with a grant for beneficial enjoyment,
for consideration, without effecting a taking. If the grant spe-
cifically reserves a public interest, however, the grant is held
subject to that interest.251
iii. Magnitude of Grant
On very rare occasions, the courts have found grants of
submerged lands invalid on the grounds that the state has
given away too much and, therefore, impermissibly abdicated
its sovereign power to manage trust lands for the benefit of
the public.252 The limitation is vague and fact sensitive. An
examination of the specific cases where the courts have inval-
idated grants of submerged lands, however, sheds some light
on how much is too much.
The principal case in New York to examine the outer lim-
its of the state's power to convey absolute fee to trust lands is
Coxe v. State.253 The question in Coxe was the validity of leg-
islation authorizing a private development corporation to fill
and take title to all tidal marsh lands, with some exceptions,
248. 271 U.S. 364 (1926) (rev'g 139 N.E. 474 (N.Y. 1923)). See supra notes
159-70 and accompanying text for a full discussion of Appleby).
249. People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521, 522 (N.Y. 1916).
250. See supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text for an analysis of Ap-
pleby. New York cases following Appleby include: In re Water Front on North
River, 219 N.Y.S. 353 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1926); In re Water Front in
Thompkinsville, 220 N.Y.S. 18 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1927).
251. Steeplechase, 113 N.E. 521. See also Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal
Co., 85 N.E. 1093 (N.Y. 1908) (holding that the grant of lands to a riparian
owner with a restriction prohibiting obstruction of public access along the shore
will be construed in view of the grantee's reasonable necessity and right to ac-
cess navigable waters as a riparian owner).
252. See, e.g., Coxe v. State, 39 N.E. 400 (N.Y. 1895); Long Sault Dev. Co. v.
Kennedy, 105 N.E. 849 (N.Y. 1914).
253. 39 N.E. 400 (N.Y. 1895).
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on Long Island and Staten Island.254 The court employed
general language indicating that the legislature's wholesale
disposition of public trust lands for speculative and private
purposes exceeded its authority.25 5 The opinion went on to
hold that the legislation also violated the delegation to Con-
gress of the exclusive power to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. 256 Finally, the court held that the legislation
violated the state constitution by embracing more than one
subject and failing to indicate the nature of the legislation in
its title.257
To the extent the court in Coxe relied upon public trust
doctrine to strike the legislation,258 the holding is diluted by
its alternate grounds. The New York Court of Appeals, how-
ever, has relied subsequently upon the public trust language
in Coxe.
In Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy,259 at issue was the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature conveying to a
private corporation the control of navigation to a segment of
the St. Lawrence River.260 The corporation was formed for
the principal purpose of generating hydroelectric power.
26
'
The proposed site on the St. Lawrence consisted mainly of
rapids and was not navigable for most of the year. 262 The au-
thorized grant of the submerged lands was conditioned upon
the corporation's construction of locks to improve public navi-
254. Id. at 400. More exactly, the validity of the legislation was put at issue
when the legislature repealed the law forming the corporation and authorizing
it to take tidal lands. Id. The case arose when a creditor of the corporation
claimed $25,000 from the state, a sum actually paid into the state treasury by
the corporation pursuant to the legislation. Id.
255. 39 N.E. at 402-03.
256. Id. at 403.
257. Id. (emphasis added). The New York Constitution prohibits local or pri-
vate bills from containing more than one subject, and requires that the subject
be expressed in the title to the bill. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 15.
258. The court also cites Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892),
for the proposition that "the state is powerless to divest itself' of its title to trust
lands held for the benefit of the public. Coxe, 39 N.E. at 402.
259. 105 N.E. 849 (N.Y. 1914).
260. Id. at 851.
261. Id. at 852.
262. Id.
7971996]
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gation. 263 Citing Coxe and Illinois Cent. R.R., the court held
that the state could not divest itself of, nor delegate, control
of the public navigable waters of the St. Lawrence to a pri-
vate corporation. 26 4
In Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton Street Realty Corp. ,265
the Court of Appeals considered the validity of a colonial
grant conveying the entire eleven miles of ocean front tidal
lands found in the borough of Queens, New York City.266 The
colonial grant expressly conveyed the beach, to the low water
mark, to a private individual. The court noted that similar
grants to political entities were valid delegations of sovereign
power, but that such a vast conveyance to a private party was
"contrary to . .. public policy and the law and, therefore,
void."267
Out of these cases two rules emerge. The first rule is
clear: the state may not convey to a private entity an entire
segment of a navigable waterway subject to public trust,268
even where the conveyance is conditioned upon public rights
of navigation' and the duty to improve the navigability of the
waterway. 269
The second rule is less certain: there is a limit to the size
of trust lands that the state may permissibly alienate to a
private entity. The pertinent cases, Marba Sea Bay and
Coxe, do not draw a fine line. In Marba Sea Bay, the entire
ocean front beach of Queens County was at issue.270 The
grants were of such magnitude that the court could not credi-
bly uphold them without declaring that the public trust doc-
trine was no longer the law of the State of New York.271 The
263. 105 N.E. at 852.
264. Id.
265. 5 N.E.2d 824, 825 (N.Y. 1936).
266. See id. at 825.
267. Id. at 825-26.
268. Title to the beds of most rivers is held privately. The St. Lawrence
River, however, forms a state boundary, and title to the riverbed is vested in the
state. See supra part III.A.3.a.
269. Long Sault Dev. Co., 105 N.E. at 852.
270. 39 N.E. at 401.
271. The court also found that such large grants were per se contrary to the
public interest. See Coxe, 39 N.E. at 402-403 (noting first that the state cannot
transfer title to land if the transfer is not in the public interest, and second that
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limitation concerning the size of a permissible grant is so un-
defined that Coxe and Marba Sea Bay serve mainly as warn-
ings to the legislature rather than as guides.
In sum, the limitation on the magnitude of permissible
grants is a reservation of judicial power to annul grants au-
thorized by the legislature. Thus far, the judiciary has only
exercised its power in the most egregious cases. By not defin-
ing a threshold for a permissible grant, however, the judici-
ary has reserved the power to annul any grant that it
determines is too much.
iv. Abandonment of Use
In New York, the implication from the cases construing
title is that grants of public trust lands have no possibility of
reverter by virtue of their character as public trust lands.
272
If the rule applies, abandonment of use can have no impact
on title. The language of the grant, however, may create a
defeasible estate.273 The courts have not decided definitively
whether conditional grants for commercial purposes, which
are vested but then subsequently appropriated to purely pri-
vate non-commercial uses or abandoned, convey absolute title
excluding a possibility of re-entry by the state.
274
the grant at issue affected four counties); Marba Sea Bay, 5 N.E.2d at 825 (stat-
ing that "[tihe grant of eleven miles of foreshore, being the entire ocean front of
the borough of Queens, which grant is to a private person for neither commer-
cial nor governmental purposes, is not one recognized by law."). Thus, the pub-
lic interest may be nothing more than a corollary to the impermissible size of
the grant.
272. See supra part Ill.A.3.c.iii. Grants to railroads are a probable excep-
tion. See infra notes 404-14 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
274. The courts might consider the abandonment of a commercial use, or ap-
propriation to non-commercial use, a violation of the grant, giving the state a
cause of action for re-entry subject to the statute of limitations. See supra part
IU.A.3.c.i. This possibility is suggested by In re Water Front, and supported by
legislation that implies a reserved state interest in grants that are for less than
beneficial enjoyment. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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B. Railroad Law
1. Statutory Protection of Access
Statutory provisions restrict the railroads' use of lands to
protect access to the Hudson River. Grants of submerged
lands are only available if required for a right-of-way.27 1 The
charter of the Hudson River Railroad Company explicitly pro-
tects the upland owners' "usual access to the river" and re-
quires the railroad to restore the use of wharves and docks
severed from the river by construction of a road.2 76 Where
the railroad crosses a highway or street, the railroad is re-
sponsible for required alterations, or bridging, to restore the
road to its former usefulness. 277
2. Grade Crossing Elimination
Since the end of the 19th Century, through both legisla-
tive enactments 278 and an addition to the state constitu-
tion,279 it has been the policy of the State of New York to
275. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 18 (McKinney 1991). Filled lands and railroad bridges
may not cause flooding, nor block navigation. Rumsey v. New York & New Eng-
land R.R., 28 N.E. 763 (citing Act of Apr. 2, 1850, ch. 140, 1850 N.Y. Laws 211).
The court noted that the obligation of a railroad company to "restore the stream
or water-course... [crossed by a railroad] to its former state, or to such a state
as not unnecessarily to have impaired its usefulness" had been deleted from the
railroad law by Act of June 7, 1890, ch. 565, 1890 N.Y. Laws 1082. Id. at 765.
In fact, the provision had been relocated and expanded so as to additionally
prohibit any interference with the navigation of steamboats and sailboats. Act
of June 2, 1890, ch. 565, § 11, 1890 N.Y. Laws 1082, 1087.
276. Act of Apr. 22, 1846, 1846 N.Y. Laws 272, 279-80, ch. 216, §§ 15-16. Use
of the right-of-way can only reasonably affect the upland owner's riparian right
of access to navigable waters. See infra part III.C.1.
277. See infra part III.B.3.
278. See Act of Mar. 26, 1906, ch. 109, 1906 N.Y. Laws 213; Act of July 25,
1911, ch. 777, 1911 N.Y. Laws 2065; Act of June 2, 1917, ch. 719, 1917 N.Y.
Laws 2361; Act of Mar. 30, 1927, chs. 444-46, 1927 N.Y. Laws 1113-1125; Act of
Mar. 27, 1928, ch. 677, 1928 N.Y. Laws 1455; Apr. 13, 1939, ch. 289, 1939 N.Y.
Laws 669 (codified as amended at Grade Crossing Elimination Act of 1970, N.Y.
TRANsp. LAW §§ 220-29 (McKinney 1991)). See also N.Y. R.R. LAW § 91 (McKin-
ney 1991).
279. See N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 14 (1941 amendment authorizing legislature
to issue $300 million in bonds to finance grade crossing eliminations).
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eliminate grade crossings.280 The Commissioner of Transpor-
tation (Commissioner), was authorized to order the relocation
or elimination of grade crossings.281 In addition, the Com-
missioner was directed to avoid creation of new grade cross-
ings. 28 2 As a consequence of these provisions, no public
crossings can be built without the approval of the
Commissioner.28 s
Until 1994, the Commissioner only had jurisdiction over
public crossings.28 4 However, in 1994, the New York State
Legislature amended the Railroad Law to allow the Commis-
sioner to require alterations and/or closures of private cross-
280. "A grade crossing in the ordinary sense... refers to the crossing of a
railroad location by a highway on the level of the railroad." Armour & Co. v.
New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 103 A. 1031, 1033 (R.I. 1918).
281. Under Article II of New York Highway Law, the Commissioner of
Transportation shall "[p~rovide for the separation of highway-railroad crossings
and construction of highway-railroad crossings at grade .... " N.Y. HIGH. LAw
§ 10(26) (McKinney 1979) (applicable to state highways). Any municipality in
which a grade crossing is located, or any railroad company whose tracks are
crossed at grade by a highway, may initiate proceedings to eliminate grade
crossings upon petition to the Commissioner. In addition, upon his own motion,
the Commissioner may investigate any other grade crossings which he deter-
mines should be considered for elimination. N.Y. TRANMP. LAw § 222(3) (appli-
cable to county or local roads). See also N.Y. TRANSP. LAW §§ 223-24 (governing
reimbursement by the state for elimination costs); N.Y. R.R. LAw § 91 (McKin-
ney 1991) (alteration or elimination of grade crossings procedure).
282. N.Y. R.R. LAW § 89 (McKinney 1991). This provision prohibits the crea-
tion of public grade crossings after 1897 without the authorization of the Com-
missioner. For the history of section 89, see 1910 N.Y. Laws 923-24; Act of May
26, 1913, ch. 744, 1913 N.Y. Laws 1866; Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 378, 1914 N.Y.
Laws 1523; Act of Apr. 25, 1924, ch. 481, § 1, 1924 N.Y. Laws 891, 891; Act of
Mar. 28, 1928, ch. 546, 1928 N.Y. Laws 1185; Act of Apr. 18, 1945, ch. 855, § 58,
1945 N.Y. Laws 1890, 1917-34; Act of May 31, 1968, ch. 420, § 251, 1968 N.Y.
Laws 1467, 1609-10; Act of Apr. 29, 1970, ch. 267, § 25, 1970 N.Y. Laws 1347,
1482-83 (codified as amended at N.Y. R.R. LAw § 89 (McKinney 1991)).
283. Whether the crossing is "public" under the railroad law determines the
jurisdiction of the DOT and the availability of public funds for crossing im-
provements. See Neuhaus v. Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y.S.2d 930 (App. Div., 2d
Dep't 1968).
284. In re New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 93 N.E. 515, 516 (N.Y.
1910) (holding that statutory proceedings under section 91 to alter or close a
grade crossing only apply to public streets).
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ings,28 5 including farm crossings, located in an inter-city rail
passenger service corridor.28 6
3. Crossing Construction and Maintenance
Railroads are responsible for all crossing costs when con-
structing a new line.28 7 The first act to authorize and regu-
late railroad corporations provided that when the railroad
track crossed a highway, such highway may be carried under
or over the track, as may be most expedient. 28 8 In addition,
the corporation was given the power to construct its road
across, along, or upon any water-course or street, provided
that the railroad restored the intersected entity to its former
state, or to such a state as not to unnecessarily impair its
usefulness. 28 9
285. Intercity rail passenger service, N.Y. R.R. LAw § 97 (McKinney 1991 &
Supp. 1995). "Private rail crossing" is defined by the statute as a crossing
which traverses a railroad track or tracks and may be used by the owner of the
right-of-way, the owner's invitees and others, including the public, but has not
been declared or recognized as a public rail crossing by the Commissioner. Id.
Jurisdiction over private crossings was requested by the DOT to "advance the
development of a [sic] intercity rail passenger service... " DOT Memorandum
No. 4-1994, Dept. Bill No. 516.
286. "Inter-city rail passenger service" means any inter-city rail passenger
transportation operation where rail passenger trains operate on a regular
scheduled basis. "Inter-city rail service corridor" is defined as a continuous rail-
road route which contains one or more segments of railroad track or tracks
where inter-city rail passenger service is in operation by the national rail pas-
senger corporation (Amtrak). N.Y. R.R. LAw § 97. The section is not applicable,
therefore, to the west shore where Amtrak does not operate. This section also
requires application to the Commissioner for the establishment of new private
rail crossings in an inter-city rail passenger service corridor. Id.
287. Whenever under section 89 a new railroad is constructed across an ex-
isting street, the expense of crossing above or below the grade of the street,
including any expense incurred in altering or changing the street, is paid en-
tirely by the railroad corporation. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 94 (McKinney 1991).
288. Act of Apr. 2, 1850, ch. 140, 1850 N.Y. Laws 211. See also Act of May
12, 1846, ch. 216, 1846 N.Y. Laws 272 (authorizing the formation of the Hudson
River Railroad). In 1884, the legislature passed an act to provide for the con-
struction, extension, maintenance and operation of street surface railroads and
branches thereof in cities, towns and villages (intra-city trains). Act of May 5,
1884, ch. 252, 1884 N.Y. Laws 308.
289. Act of Apr. 2, 1850, ch. 140, 1850 N.Y. Laws 211.
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In 1890, the authority of the railroad under the Act of
1850290 was limited. Under the 1890 law, the railroad could
not construct a bridge across a stream or lake, or a road
across a street, without the consent of the municipality or an
order from a special term of the supreme court.
291
Whenever a new street is constructed across an existing
railroad, the railroad corporation pays one-half of the cost
and the municipal corporation having jurisdiction over such
street pays the remaining one-half.292 The Commissioner de-
termines whether the street will cross the railroad above, be-
low, or at grade, and the safest way to accomplish the
crossing.293 The Commissioner is obliged to avoid grade
crossings where feasible.
294
Section 91 of the Railroad Law also permits the Commis-
sioner to order the alteration of a crossing, upon petition of
the affected municipality or railroad corporation, when the
Commissioner determines that the alteration is in the public
interest.295 The expenses of every change made in accord-
ance with section 91 are borne 85% by the state and 15% by
the municipal corporation in which the crossing sits.296 How-
ever, whenever a change is made to an existing crossing,
other than a change made in accordance with the provisions
of section 91,297 50% of the expense is borne by the railroad
290. 1850 N.Y. Laws at 211.
291. Act of June 7, 1890, ch. 565, 1890 N.Y. Laws 1082, 1136.
292. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 94.
293. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 90. For the history of section 90, see 1910 N.Y. Laws
923-24; Act of May 26, 1913, ch. 744, 1913 N.Y. Laws 1866; Act of Apr. 16, 1914,
ch. 378, 1914 N.Y. Laws 1523; Act of May 12, 1921, ch. 698, § 1, 1921 N.Y. Laws
2467; Act of Apr. 25, 1924, ch. 481, § 2, 1924 N.Y. Laws 891, 892-4; Act of Mar.
23, 1928, ch. 546, § 19, 1928 N.Y. Laws 1185, 1202-05; Act of Apr. 18, 1945, ch.
855, § 58, 1945 N.Y. Laws 1890, 1934-35; Act of May 31, 1968, ch. 420, § 252,
1968 N.Y. Laws 1467, 1610-11; Act of May 9, 1969, ch. 430, § 10, 1969 N.Y.
Laws 1498, 1505-07; Act of Apr. 29, 1970, ch. 267, § 26, 1970 N.Y. Laws 1347,
1484-86 (codified as amended at N.Y. R.R. LAw § 90).
294. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
295. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 91.
296. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 94(3).
297. For example, the Commissioner may institute proceedings on his own
motion for the alteration of an existing grade crossing or structure when, in his
opinion, public safety requires the alteration. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 95. Such an al-
teration is one made other than in accordance with section 91, and thus the
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corporation, 25% by the municipal corporation, and 25% by
the state. 298
When a street crosses a railroad by an overhead bridge,
the framework of the bridge and its abutments are main-
tained by the railroad, and the roadbed and approaches to the
bridge are maintained by the municipality having jurisdic-
tion over the street.299 Since both the railroads and the mu-
nicipalities would like to avoid such maintenance costs, the
definitions of "roadway," "approaches," and "framework of the
bridge and its abutments" are often at issue. 0 0
Railroads are fully responsible for maintaining the struc-
ture and roadway of bridges constructed prior to July 1, 1897,
if they had such an obligation prior to 1897.01 When a pre-
railroad must split the expense with the municipality and the state pursuant to
section 94(3). In re Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry., 221 N.Y.S. 129, 144 (App.
Div., 2d Dep't 1927), affd, 157 N.E. 892 (N.Y. 1927), affd, 276 U.S. 603 (1928).
298. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 94(3). In addition, "there is no question that if the
change is reasonably necessary in the interests of public safety, the [Commis-
sioner] may insist upon it regardless of the prospective bankruptcy of the rail-
road company financially burdened thereby." In re Lehigh Valley R.R. & Tioga
St., 5 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948-49 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1938).
299. N.Y. R.R. LAW § 93. Under this section, the railroad is required only to
maintain the bridge framework and abutments as originally designed. In re
Morris Ave. Bridge, 174 N.Y.S. 682 (Sup. Ct. 1919). If an alteration, as opposed
to maintenance, is required in the existing structure due to an increase in traf-
fic over the bridge in excess of that which could have been contemplated when
the bridge was originally built, the procedures of section 91 must be followed.
Id. at 683.
300. If the purpose of a member of a bridge structure is to provide form and
strength to the bridge crossing a railroad, it must be maintained and repaired
by the railroad. 18 Op. Comptroller 236 (1962). The term roadway, however,
may also include the immediate support for the pavement even if the support
also serves a structural function. For example, the steel plating which supports
the asphalt pavement of an overhead bridge is part of the roadway, and must be
maintained by the municipality. 18 Op. Comp. 236 (1962). See also New York
Cent. R.R. v. Erie County, 95 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307-09 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (railings
along the sidewalks not a part of the framework of the bridge).
301. N.Y. R.R. LAW § 93. The railroad's duty to maintain a bridge built by
the railroad before 1897 is not limited to instances where the railroad crossed
an existing highway. Pennsylvania R.R. v. City of Rochester, 37 N.Y.S.2d 471
(Sup. Ct. 1942), aftd, 47 N.Y.S.2d 288 (App. Div., 4th Dep't 1943), affld, 59
N.E.2d 178 (N.Y. 1944). The evidence of an agreement concerning the mainte-
nance of a bridge can be lost quickly, if it ever existed at all. In one case, de-
cided in 1916, the evidence showed that a bridge had been constructed before
1897, but the plaintiff town apparently had no knowledge or evidence of an
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/28
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1897 bridge is replaced, the law is uncertain as to whether
the bridge retains its pre-1897 status. If a bridge is replaced
by a railroad for its own purposes, the railroad may remain
solely liable for its maintenance. 30 2 On the other hand, re-
placement can result in the loss of pre-1897 status.
3 03
The maintenance responsibility of either the railroad or
the municipality can be discharged in certain situations.
When a railroad sells its road beneath a bridge, the obligation
it had to maintain the structural portion of the bridge reverts
to the municipality.3 0 4 In addition, where a county has taken
over the roadway and approaches to a bridge above a railroad
as part of a county road, the county becomes liable for all
maintenance and repair.30 5
4. Eminent Domain
The power of eminent domain is the right of the govern-
ment to take private property for a public purpose or use.
Courts have held that this power is an inherent attribute of
agreement concerning the maintenance of the bridge. Town of Cortlandt v.
New York Cent. R.R., 161 N.Y.S. 377 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1916) (deciding that
the statute governed the respective obligations of the town and the railroad for
the maintenance of the highway bridge leading to Croton Point).
302. Town of Cortlandt v. New York Cent. R.R., 161 N.Y.S. 377 (App. Div.,
2d Dep't 1916), affd, 115 N.E. 1052 (N.Y. 1917) (holding that bridge replaced by
railroad solely for railroad improvements retains its status as a pre-1897
bridge). See also City of New York v. Long Island R.R., 5 N.E.2d 380 (N.Y.
1936) (railroad to maintain the roadway and the framework of a bridge which
passed over property used only for railroad yard purposes).
303. City of Mt. Vernon v. Feinberg, 113 N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div., 3d Dep't
1952) (declining to follow Cortlandt on grounds it was dicta and under facts
suggesting bridge replaced or modified for highway traffic purposes on several
occasions). Resurfacing alone does not result in a loss of pre-1897 status. Penn-
sylvania R.R. v. City of Rochester, 59 N.E.2d 178 (N.Y. 1944).
304. 81 Op. Att'y Gen. 144 (1981). But see City of Middletown v. Walkill
Transit Co., 193 N.Y.S. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (holding that where a trolley rail-
way company's predecessor erected a highway bridge crossing a railroad, and
agreed with the railroad company to maintain the bridge, the agreement did
not relieve the railroad from its primary liability to the municipality under
Railroad Law § 93 for cost of repairing the framework). However, sections 93-a
and 93-b of the Railroad Law provide that the responsibility of a railroad to
maintain and keep in repair the bridge does not terminate upon the abandon-
ment of the railroad, unless otherwise agreed upon by the railroad and the gov-
erning body. N.Y. R.R. LAW §§ 93-a, 93-b.
305. 1971 Op. Att'y. Gen. 117.
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sovereignty vested in the legislature and, as such, exists
without constitutional authorization. 30 6 The New York State
Constitution, however, does require the payment of just com-
pensation.30 7 Provided just compensation is paid, the state
may condemn private property when "necessary" to serve a
"public purpose."30 8 Necessity is a legislative determination
subject only to the deferential judicial review of whether the
authority acted in "good faith and with sound discretion."30 9
Whether the condemnation serves a public purpose or use,
however, is a judicial question.310 The analysis is also quite
different where a private corporation wields the power under
a delegation from the legislature.
The state may delegate the power of eminent domain to
railroad companies under the settled rule that they perform a
public purpose.31 ' The power to determine necessity, how-
ever, is not delegated to the corporation; rather, it is a purely
judicial question.31 2 An analysis of the authority delegated to
the railroads must begin with the applicable statutes.
Under the General Railroad Act of 1850, 31' the railroads
could exercise the power of eminent domain only to acquire
lands necessary to their right-of-way.3 1 4 The Hudson River
Railroad was initially given the slightly broader power to con-
demn land for the right-of-way or land affected by the opera-
tion of the right-of-way.31 5 An 1869 amendment to the
General Railroad Law permitted the railroad to condemn
lands required for the "purposes of its incorporation."3 16
306. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc. v. City of New York, 183 N.E.2d 684,
687 (N.Y. 1962); People v. Priest, 99 N.E. 547, 552 (N.Y. 1912); Heyward v.
Mayor of New York, 7 N.Y. 314, 324 (1852).
307. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring payment of just compensation).
308. People v. Fisher, 83 N.E. 482, 485 (N.Y. 1908).
309. Id.
310. In re City of Brooklyn, 38 N.E. 983, 989 (N.Y. 1894), affd sub nom. Long
Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1896).
311. Rensselaer & Saratoga R.R. v. Davis, 43 N.Y. 137, 142 (1870).
312. Id. at 144.
313. Act of Apr. 2, 1850, ch. 140, 1850 N.Y. Laws 211.
314. Id. § 14, 1850 N.Y. Laws at 216-18.
315. Act of May 12, 1846, ch. 216, § 10, 1846 N.Y. Laws 272, 275-78.
316. Act of Apr. 17, 1869, ch. 237, 1869 N.Y. Laws 441.
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The language of the statute is broad, but the courts have
limited its import to land required for the roads, yards, termi-
nals, and facilities for the temporary storage of freight.
3 17
Condemnation to acquire manufacturing facilities, worker
housing,3 18 and gravel quarries are not within the statutory
delegation.31 9
When a railroad seeks waterfront facilities to receive
shipping traffic and lands in excess of its immediate needs,
the question of the railroad's power is less certain. In Rensse-
laer & Saratoga R.R. v. Davis,320 the court found that the
need for docking facilities in anticipation of increased de-
mand was speculative, mainly serving to enhance the rail-
road's competitive position against private interests,
including other common carriers. 32 ' The court held that the
railroad had to show "beyond a reasonable doubt, that such
increase [in demand] will occur."3 22 The court found such
proof lacking and stated that it did not think that the "con-
struction of slips for the accommodation of vessels" was a nec-
essary corporate purpose.3 23
Seven years later, in New York Cent. & Hudson River
R.R., the Court of Appeals permitted that railroad to con-
demn a large portion of the water front in New York City,
including piers and submerged lands.3 24 The court distin-
guished Rensselaer & Saratoga R.R. on the grounds that the
earlier case relied on the speculative and competitive pur-
poses for which the railroad sought title to the lands. 325 The
court refused to question whether all the lands were required
for expansion, finding that the "weight of evidence" was "con-
317. In re N.Y. & Harlem River R.R. v. Kip, 46 N.Y. 546, 552-53 (1871).
318. Id. at 552 (citations omitted).
319. In re N.Y. & Canada R.R. v. Gunnison, 3 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 632 (1874).
320. 43 N.Y. at 137.
321. Id. at 146.
322. Id. at 145.
323. Id. at 146. The court stated, however, that the railroad could acquire
such facilities by ordinary purchase. Id. The distinction is dicta. The applica-
ble railroad law restricted all real estate ownership to lands necessary to the
corporate purpose. See § 28(3), 1850 N.Y. Laws at 224.
324. In re N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 77 N.Y. 248 (1879).
325. Id. at 259.
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vincing" that the railroad needed more lands for its present
needs, and to accommodate a "large increase of freight [that]
may and will occur.... " 3 26 In sum, New York Cent. & Hud-
son River R.R. held that railroads may acquire waterfront fa-
cilities and some excess lands provided, at least, that it has
an immediate need to expand and convincing proof that its
need for excess lands is not merely speculative.3 27
5. Abandonment of Railroad Lands
The title a railroad obtains by condemnation of a right-of-
way is in the nature of a permanent easement for the sole
purpose of the railroad.s 28 When a road is abandoned, as
happens upon the dissolution of the corporation3 29 or the sale
of the right-of-way for non-railroad purposes, title reverts to
the grantor.330
Lands acquired for a depot, however, are taken in fee
simple without possibility of reverter. 331 Actual use of the
lands for a depot is not required to vest absolute title,3 32 but
326. Id. at 265-66 (stating that findings concerning prospective needs met
test of Rensselaer and Saratoga R.R. Co.).
327. The decision commanded a bare majority, 4-3, and the opinion only a
plurality (Miller, Rapallo, and Earl, JJ., concurring in the opinion; Church,
C.J., concurring in the result; Folger, Andrews, and Danforth, JJ. dissenting).
The case may represent, therefore, the outer bounds of the railroad's power to
exercise eminent domain.
328. 0 & W Lines, Inc. v. St. John, 228 N.E.2d 370, 371-72 (N.Y. 1967).
329. If the corporation is dissolved pursuant to its acquisition by another
railroad, its corporate existence is continued through the merger. Miner v. New
York Cent. & Harlem River R.R., 25 N.E. 339 (N.Y. 1890).
330. Id.; In re Harlem River Drive, 121 N.E.2d 414, 416 (N.Y. 1954). See Act
of Apr. 2, 1850, ch. 140, § 18, 1850 N.Y. Laws 211, 219-20 ("the company shall
be entitled to enter upon, takes possession of, and use the [condemned] land for
the purposes of its incorporation, during the continuance of its corporate exist-
ence . . . ."). The durational provision was deleted by Act of Apr. 22, 1964, ch.
735, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1902, but remains applicable to lands acquired under the
earlier provision.
331. 0 & W Lines. Inc., 228 N.E.2d at 373 (holding that amendment of the
General Railroad Law vests railroads with absolute fee in lands condemned for
depots).
332. Ellar Estates Corp. v. Cohen, 383 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div., 2d Dep't
1976) (holding that proceedings to acquire lands for a depot conclusively vested
absolute title in railroad, despite fact that lands were only used for a hotel and
"places of amusement").
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an intention to so use, or actual use as a depot, must be
proved. 333 Title to lands acquired by purchase is only limited
by the language of the deed.3 34
The courts have not considered whether title to trust
lands granted to railroads is defeasible upon the abandon-
ment of use. However, some railroad grants specifically re-
serve the power of the state to revoke the grant, although the
power of revocation is not limited to abandoned railroad
lands.335
6. Tort Liability and Public Safety
Railroads create a barrier to river access for two reasons.
First, railroads are dangerous and subject to many regulatory
controls designed to protect public safety. Second, railroads
face the possibility of financial liability for personal injuries
resulting from their operations. Consequently, railroads
have a financial interest in excluding the public from their
dangerous right-of-ways, and issues of tort liability and pub-
lic safety come to have a direct impact on public access to the
Hudson River.
Liability and safety concerns have prompted the federal
and state governments to take steps to reduce rail acci-
dents.33 6 The policy of promoting safety is furthered by regu-
333. Schenectady Chem., Inc. v. DeLuke Sand & Gravel Co., 286 N.Y.S.2d
902 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1968) (holding that where purpose is not indicated in
condemnation proceedings, purpose is a question for the finder of fact).
334. Nicoll v. New York & Erie R.R., 12 N.Y. 121 (1854).
335. "This grant is made subject to revocation by the State under its trust
powers for the benefit of the People of the State." New York State Letters Pat-
ent, Book 47, p. 570 (May 16, 1913). The appearance of this language in some,
but not all grants, permits the argument that when omitted, the state intended
to grant fee simple absolute. Nonetheless, because the power of revocation is
absolute, thereby reserving an extraordinary power in the state, its absence in a
grant does not foreclose the more ordinary reversion or power of re-entry on
abandoned railroad lands.
336. Accidents involving motorists and pedestrians along the railroads'
right-of-way are a national problem. As of 1973, there were 395,000 grade
crossings in the United States. 214,000 were public crossings. Benson C. Mar-
shall, Defending the Defensible: A Railroad Grade Crossing Accident, ISSUES IN
RAILWAY LAw, 1990 A.B.A. TORT AND INS. PRAC. SEC. 193-251, 204. In 1981,
there were 8546 accidents at grade crossings, or approximately one accident for
every four grade crossings during the calendar year (an accident frequency of
1996] 809
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lating railroad operations and public access to the right-of-
way.337 Liability relates to the railroads' financial ability to
approximately 0.25 per year/crossing), resulting in 697 deaths and 3121 inju-
ries. Dale Haralson, Trying a Grade Crossing Case, 25 TRIAL 40 (1989) (citing
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BULL. No. 4, RAIL-HIGHWAY CROSSING ACCIDENT INCI-
DENT AND INVENTORY BULL. (1982)).
The Hudson River Railroad has a long history of injuries and deaths result-
ing from its operations. Between 1863 and 1864, for example, the railroad re-
ported twenty-one serious injuries or deaths, half of which appear to have
involved persons using a grade crossing or the railroad right-of-way. ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE STATE ENGINEER AND SURVEYOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1865). Today, along the Hudson River line (east-
ern shore), there are twelve active grade crossings (including five unimproved
pedestrian crossings) south of the Poughkeepsie station (the northern terminus
of Metro-North commuter service, a subsidiary of the Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Authority (MTA)). See PACE REPORT, supra note 7, at app. A. Between
1989 and 1995 the total accident frequency (mostly involving pedestrians) was
0.33 per year/crossing in the MTA service area, or approximately one accident
at each crossing every three years. See Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
Vehicle Incidents at Grade Crossings, Hudson Line (computer printout May 4,
1995) (on file with author) (three accidents involved MTA trains and the fourth
an Amtrak train); Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Trespassers on Hud-
son Line (computer printout May 3, 1995) (on file with author). Although the
figures suggest that New York has a higher injury rate than the national aver-
age, the risk of injury, factoring the frequency of trains and crossing use, may
be less than the national average.
The most serious collisions are between trains and do not implicate public
access. For example, in 1987, an Amtrak passenger train collided with a Con-
rail freight train, resulting in fifteen passenger deaths and 174 injuries. Hear-
ings, supra note 15, at 86 (Background Paper on Eliminating or Limiting
Punitive Damages for Railroad Passenger Deaths and Injuries). Punitive and
compensatory damages amounted to $134 million. Id. at 36 (statement of Ed-
win L. Harper, Pres., Association of American Railroads).
337. The federal government has encouraged the elimination of grade cross-
ings. 23 U.S.C. § 130 (1994) (federal funds for grade crossing elimination); 45
U.S.C. § 650(a) (Supp. V 1993) (federal mandate to eliminate grade crossings in
the Northeast Corridor). It also sponsors the development of sophisticated
train control technologies. 59 Fed. Reg. 46,470 (1994). Finally, it has en-
couraged the improvement of traffic control devices at existing grade crossings.
23 U.S.C. § 130.
New York's initiatives to reduce liability focus on the reduction of hazards
posed by grade crossings in addition to the regulation of railroad safety gener-
ally. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 17(C), §§ 910.0-924.31 (1995). For ex-
ample, the DOT regulates signage and crossing control technology. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 17(B), §§ 220.1-220.4, 277.1-277.9, 278.1-278.6, 279.1-
279.11 (1995). The DOT also has the authority to close grade crossings. See
supra part III.B.2. State law requires motorists to come to a full stop before
grade crossings. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1170 (McKinney 1986) (where warn-
ing of oncoming train); Id. § 1171 (certain vehicles must always stop); Id. § 1176
64http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/28
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provide service.338 A number of legal principles serve to
lessen the liability exposure of the railroads.
Federal regulations governing speed limits preempt tort
claims alleging that a train, although in compliance with fed-
eral speed limits, was traveling at an excessive speed. 339
(vehicles may not block a crossing at any time). Railroads must install and
maintain such signs and traffic control devices at public crossings as are re-
quired by the DOT. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 53 (McKinney 1991).
338. To protect high-speed passenger rail operators from liability, the United
States Senate considered legislation, S. 839 (not enacted), that required appli-
cant states to create funds in the amount of $500 million to indemnify railroad
companies of all liability from high-speed rail passenger services. 140 CONG.
REC. S12,128-S12,129 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1994). The legislation was prompted
partly by the fact that indemnification agreements from passenger rail opera-
tors are required by the owners of the rights-of-way, typically freight carriers.
Hearings, supra note 15, at 86. These agreements may indemnify the owners
from all liability to rail passengers, regardless of fault. Id.; see also Liability
Apportionment Agreement between Conrail and Amtrak § 8 (June 19, 1979) (on
file with the author). Amtrak disputed the meaning of the apparently blanket
indemnification, arguing that it has not indemnified Conrail for accidents aris-
ing from "deliberate or knowing disregard or disablement of safety signals,
safety mechanisms, or safety systems [by Conrail employees] .... " Letter from
Stephen C. Rogers, General Counsel, Amtrak, to Bruce P. Wilson, Senior Vice
President - Law, Conrail (Jan. 29, 1992) (on file with author).
339. The Secretary of Transportation has established speed limits for freight
and passenger trains that depend upon track classification. 49 C.F.R.
§§ 213.51-.59, 213.101-.143 (1993) (six classifications of track based upon geom-
etry and structure); Id. § 213.9 (speed limits). The regulations are promulgated
under the authority of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
458, 84 Stat. 971 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.A.). The act contains an explicit provision regarding the preemptive ef-
fect of the Secretary's standards. 49 U.S.C.A. § 20106 (West 1994). The federal
speed limits preempt any state regulation of train speed, whether by statute or
by common law. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737-38
(1993). Nonetheless, the statute contains a savings provision whereby states
may promulgate more stringent standards to address local hazards provided
that such standards are not "incompatible" with federal law. 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 20106(2). CSX, however, left little to no room for state regulation of speed
limits, despite the savings provision. CSX, 113 S. Ct. at 1743 (stating that fed-
eral speed limits apply regardless of the presence of grade crossings and re-
jecting the argument that federal speed limits are only designed to prevent
derailments and not safe speeds in view of local conditions); see also Mahony v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 966 F.2d 644, 646-47 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., concurring)
(criticizing CSX and arguing that a train can exceed a safe speed although obey-
ing federal speed limits); Landrum v. Norfolk S. Corp., 836 F. Supp. 373, 375
(S.D. Miss. 1993) (arguing that the state legislature, at least, should be able to
reduce the speed limit at a specific crossing).
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Under New York law, crossing control devices are only re-
quired if ordered by the DOT.3 40 DOT ordered controls are
sufficient as a matter of law.341 Consequently, a plaintiff can-
not argue that the railroad was negligent for failing to install
a superior control device.3 42 Trains also have a statutory
duty to sound a warning before entering a grade crossing.
3 43
Breach of the duty, however, is inadmissible as evidence of
negligence.3 44 Nonetheless, a train may have a duty in tort to
warn of its approach.3 45
Trains also have the paramount right of way at grade
crossings.3 46 Motorists and pedestrians, therefore, must ex-
ercise caution commensurate with the risk posed at a cross-
ing.347  Where visibility is impaired, motorists and
340. Bastek v. Lehigh & New England R.R., 192 N.Y.S.2d 134 (App. Div., 2d
Dep't 1959); Ames v. Pennsylvania R.R., 186 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1959); Bailey v. Bal-
timore & Ohio R.R., 227 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1955).
341. Callis v. Long Island R.R., 372 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1967).
342. Bailey v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 227 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1955). If a traffic
control device malfunctions, however, the malfunction may be used as evidence
of negligence. Davis v. Long Island R.R. Co., 95 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1950). Fed-
eral participation in the selection of crossing controls can also preempt state
tort law. CSX, 113 S. Ct. at 1737 n.4 (any uniform safety standard concerning
railroads or grade crossings may have preemptive effect under 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 20106). Federal preemption over grade crossing controls turns on the extent
of federal involvement. Federal funds must actually be used, Landrum, 836 F.
Supp. at 377, and the crossing improvements installed before preemption oc-
curs. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 39 F.3d 864
(8th Cir. 1994); Armijo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 19 F.3d 547 (10th
Cir. 1994). But see Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing no preemption of state tort law where federal funding of statewide program
to install standard crossbucks at all grade crossings was not a federal decision
that crossbucks were a sufficient control device at any particular crossing).
343. N.Y. R.R. LAW § 53-b (McKinney 1991).
344. Vandewater v. New York & New England R.R., 32 N.E. 636 (N.Y. 1892).
345. Ritter v. Merenda, 606 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. 1993). The duty is a
question of fact determined solely upon the characteristics of the crossing and
attendant circumstances. Vandewater, 32 N.E. 636. The railroad may have no
duty to warn of an approach at a private crossing, but if the private crossing is
used regularly by the public, a duty to warn may arise. McDermott v. New
York Cent. R.R., 218 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1961).
346. Siivonen v. City of Oneida, 306 N.Y.S.2d 278, 281 (App. Div., 3d Dep't
1970).
347. Delaney v. Town of Orangetown, 354 N.Y.S.2d 957, 960 (App. Div., 2d
Dep't 1974).
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pedestrians must "stop, look and listen" before proceeding
over the grade crossing.3
48
The duty of care owed to pedestrians is complicated by
the fact that, unlike vehicles, pedestrians may be found any-
where along a railroad's right-of-way. Section 83 of the New
York Railroad Law prohibits persons from walking along the
tracks, or traversing the same, except at a crossing, whether
formal or informal.3 49 Walking along the railroad tracks al-
ways violates the statute. 350 However, the railroad is never
relieved from the duty to exercise a reasonable standard of
care to a foreseeable plaintiff.351 Breach of the duty can re-
sult in substantial awards. 352
The availability of punitive damages depends upon the
operator. The New York Court of Appeals has held that the
state, and its political subdivisions, are not subject to puni-
tive damages.353 This immunity was extended to the Long
Island Railroad Company on the grounds that the parent cor-
poration, the MTA, is a public benefit corporation performing
an essentially governmental function.3 54 Thus, all MTA com-
muter railroads are immune from punitive damages. The im-
348. Id.
349. N.Y. R.R. LAW § 83 (McKinney 1991); Zambardi v. South Brooklyn Ry.,
24 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1939) (holding that the statute does not bar public use of
customary pedestrian crossings).
350. Merriman v. Baker, 348 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div., 4th Dep't 1973); Wa-
ters v. Long Island R.R., 276 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Violation of the
statute constitutes negligence per se. Carpino v. Baker, 412 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620
(App. Div., 1st Dep't 1979).
351. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 789 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding that a sleeping homeless man, whose presence was unknown to
the railroad, and who was a trespasser, was a foreseeable plaintiff because the
railroad knew the area was used by homeless persons). The contributory negli-
gence of a plaintiff, however, will reduce the plaintiffs award in proportion to
the plaintiffs fault. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976).
352. For example, where ordinary negligence by Conrail resulted in perma-
nent and serious injuries to a homeless plaintiff, the court found an award of
$2,854,741.10 reasonable for plaintiffs pain and suffering, lost wages, and med-
ical expenses. This award had been substantially reduced due to the plaintiffs
percentage of fault. Fuentes, 789 F. Supp. at 638.
353. Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 437 N.E.2d 1104 (N.Y. 1982) (personal in-
jury action).
354. Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R., 516 N.E.2d 190 (N.Y. 1987)
(punitive damages sought in tort claim arising from contract dispute).
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munity does not apply to Conrail, a for-profit corporation, nor
to Amtrak.35 5 Amtrak has requested legislative relief from
punitive damages awards to passengers.35 6
Although liability is a significant issue, the limitations
on recovery generally relieve the burden on the railroads, and
consequently, the importance of the issue to public access.
Nonetheless, federal regulations, existing liability, and public
safety combine to require the removal of grade access (formal
and informal) especially as a condition of high-speed rail
service.
C. Property Law
1. Riparian Rights
Riparian rights in regard to public trust lands and wa-
ters are essentially ones of access.357 These rights relating to
public trust waters are not absolute, rather they are
subordinate to the state and federal governments when act-
ing under the public trust to improve navigation. The ripa-
rian right of access is adversely affected in two situations:
first, where the government interferes with riparian rights to
improve navigation, and second, where the state grants pub-
lic trust lands to a third party, for purposes unrelated to navi-
gation, resulting in an interference with the upland owner's
355. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 29 (statement of W. Graham Claytor,
Jr., President, Amtrak).
356. Id. Despite requests, no congressional bill has contained tort reform
provisions. However, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has requested
public comment concerning railroad liability and possible tort reform. 60 Fed.
Reg. 15,814-815 (1995).
357. The right of access includes the right to build a dock on underwater
lands held by the sovereign, provided the dock is not inconsistent with applica-
ble law and does not interfere with navigation. Town of Brookhaven v. Smith,
80 N.E. 665 (N.Y. 1907); People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863) (holding that
construction of a dock outside the authorized pier line of New York City was a
public nuisance).
This traditional right has been modified by statute. As of 1992, docks or
wharves may no longer be built on state owned trust lands without the authori-
zation of the state. 1992 N.Y. Laws 1368, 1369 (codified at N.Y. PUB. LANDS
LAw § 75(6) (McKinney 1993)).
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riparian rights. The second situation arises when submerged
lands are granted to the railroad.3
58
In the first situation, where interference results from im-
provements to navigation, complete severance of the upland
owner's riparian rights, standing alone, does not effect a tak-
ing.3 59 Riparian rights are always subject to the implied res-
ervation of the sovereign's rights to improve navigation, even
where the riparian rights are bolstered by a grant of sub-
merged lands.3 60 If the upland owner pays for a grant of ad-
jacent submerged lands, however, and improves them by
constructing authorized wharves, the wharfage rights cannot
be cut off without compensation.3 61 The obligation to make
payment does not rest on the loss of riparian rights, but
rather on the loss of specifically conveyed wharfage rights
which were subsequently relied upon.362 The state's para-
358. The Board of Land Commissioners' power to grant lands under water is
restricted to grants to the upland owner. The only pertinent exception concerns
the railroads. See supra part III.A.3.b.ii.
359. Sage v. City of New York, 47 N.E. 1096, 1100 (N.Y. 1897).
360. Id.; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 91 N.E. 846
(N.Y. 1910) (holding that dredging a channel to improve navigation which de-
stroyed valuable oyster beds on submerged lands received under a colonial
grant was not a taking); Slingerland v. International Contracting Co., 61 N.E.
995 (N.Y. 1901) (holding that dredging operation to improve channel in Hudson
River that interfered with upland owner's fishing, ice collection, and access to
waters over submerged lands held under letters patent from the state did not
effect a taking). But see Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926) (hold-
ing that grant of submerged lands vested rights against the state, or its instru-
mentality, to improve navigation by dredging). Appleby distinguished Lewis
Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. on two grounds. First, the colonial grant was
merely proprietary and did not convey the public interest which could have
been conveyed only by Parliament. Second, the interference with the sub-
merged lands resulted from federal improvement of navigation, "and of course
[the owners of the submerged lands] had to yield." Id. at 393.
361. Langdon v. Mayor of New York, 93 N.Y. 129 (1883); Williams v. Mayor
of New York, 11 N.E. 829 (N.Y. 1887).
362. People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71 (1877) (hold-
ing that unexercised right of wharfage was merely a license subject to subse-
quent limitations by legislation). First Const. Co. v. State, 116 N.E. 1020 (N.Y.
1917) (holding that if the state conveys a wharfage right, without conveying any
fee interest in the submerged lands, the holder is entitled to compensation to
the extent the right is exercised if the state subsequently extinguishes the
right). But see Appleby, 271 U.S. at 364 (holding that an appropriation is not
necessary to vest rights). See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text for an
analysis of Appleby. Appleby, however, suggests that no rights vest against the
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mount interest is based in public trust doctrine, which limits
riparian interests as against the state.3 63
In the second situation, where a railroad takes sub-
merged lands under a grant from the state, and fills them to
construct its road, the upland owner's riparian rights are not
cut off.364 When a railroad takes title to a strip of uplands
together with submerged lands from a private owner for a
right-of-way, the railroad's title to the uplands does not sever
the upland grantor from its riparian rights, nor does it make
the railroad an upland owner within the meaning of the Pub-
lic Lands Law. 36 5 The rule is that the railroad's right to ob-
tain lands for a right-of-way provides it with a limited fee
which does not carry riparian rights, and thus cannot extin-
United States when improving navigation. 271 U.S. at 393 (citing Lewis Blue
Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913) (no taking where
private oyster beds were destroyed to improve navigation)).
363. Sage, 47 N.E. at 1101 ("[In every grant of lands bounded by navigable
waters where the tide ebbs and flows ... there is reserved by implication the
right to so improve the water front as to aid navigation for the benefit of the
general public, without compensation to the riparian owner.").
364. Rumsey v. New York & New England R.R., 30 N.E. 654 (N.Y. 1892)
(holding that riparian right of access to the river may be condemned by eminent
domain, otherwise holder is entitled to damages if a railroad blocks access);
Saunders v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 38 N.E. 992 (N.Y. 1894)
(holding that riparian right of access enforceable in equity against the railroad).
The uplands owner who takes title after the construction of a railroad, however,
may not enlarge access, if access provided by the railroad was reasonable at the
time the railroad was constructed. Hedges v. West Shore R.R., 44 N.E. 691
(N.Y. 1896).
365. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Aldridge, 32 N.E. 50 (N.Y.
1892). Under the Public Lands Law, only an upland owner can obtain a grant
to adjacent submerged lands. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. The
inability of the railroad to become vested with riparian rights by virtue of hold-
ing title to uplands for a right-of-way is clearly illustrated in In re Buffalo, 99
N.E. 850 (N.Y. 1912). There, the court held a railroad, who took title to uplands
for a right-of-way, did not obtain riparian rights even when all uplands between
its right-of-way and Lake Erie completely eroded, vesting the state with title in
the resulting submerged lands. Riparian rights, however, might attach to ap-
purtenant uplands held for general railroad yard purposes. Id. at 853-54 (stat-
ing in dicta that although the railroad may not have riparian rights by virtue of
statutory limitations concerning use, a non-railroad grantee of the railroad's
uplands might obtain riparian rights).
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guish the riparian rights appurtenant to the upland owner's
remaining lands.3 66
2. Adjoining Public Highways
Public roads that are adjacent to, or terminate upon,
navigable waters serve as public access to the waters.
367
Where a bulkhead or pier is constructed at the end of a public
street, the law will construe an easement across the improve-
ment in favor of the public for access to the navigable waters
unless the legislative authorization for the improvement ex-
plicitly restricts public access.3 68 A grant of wharfage rights
and submerged lands to the adjacent upland owner will not
be construed as inconsistent with a public easement over a
pier erected at the end of a public street.
36 9
3. Public Streets By Usage
New York does not recognize a common law public ease-
ment by prescription, nor the more limited customary right of
an identifiable community to use private property.3 70 There
are statutory provisions, however, by which streets may be-
come public by usage.3 71 These statutory provisions provide
366. Aldridge, 32 N.E. at 54. One court attempted to distinguish the right of
the state to interfere with riparian rights, as opposed to a railroad's inability to
so interfere, on the grounds that a railroad takes submerged lands for private
ends. Slingerland v. International Contracting Co., 61 N.E. 995 (N.Y. 1901).
Such reasoning would render unconstitutional the authority of a railroad to ac-
quire its right-of-way by eminent domain, a power that may only be exercised
for a public purpose. See supra part III.B.4. The better reasoning, therefore, is
that the railroad takes only a limited fee.
367. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Forty-Second St. & Grand St. Ferry R.R., 68
N.E. 864, 866 (N.Y. 1903) (citing People v. Lambier, 5 Denio 9 (1847); In re City
of Brooklyn, 73 N.Y. 179 (1878) (holding that public streets in New York City
are held as public trust lands)).
368. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 68 N.E. at 866.
369. Id. at 866-67.
370. Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 425 (N.Y. 1839); Gilles v. Orienta Beach
Club, 289 N.Y.S. 733 (Sup. Ct. 1935), affd 288 N.Y.S. 136 (App. Div., 2d Dep't
1936). For a discussion of customary rights see Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CH. L.
REV. 711 (1986).
371. N.Y. HIGH. LAW § 189 (McKinney 1979); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 6-626 (Mc-
Kinney 1973).
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that continuous use as a public road shall make the road pub-
lic. 37 2 But, the courts have interpreted these statutory provi-
sions to require more than public use. In addition to public
use, the applicable local government must have adopted the
road, usually by undertaking its maintenance. 373 The use
does not have to be hostile to the owner, but may be with the
owner's permission.374
While usage may create public streets, their abandon-
ment for six years may cut off the public right of use.37 5
Abandonment by non-usage only applies to streets where the
fee to the underlying land is privately held.37 6 Abandonment
depends upon the facts of the specific case.
The closure to vehicles is not determinative. If the ob-
struction is not across the entire width of the road, and a dis-
cernable path remains that follows the route of the prior
road, the highway has not been abandoned.377 Even if the
closure was wrongful, for example, by the construction of a
building blocking the public road, discontinuance of public
use for the statutory period of six years extinguishes the pub-
lic right of use.3 7 8 The presumption is in favor of continued
use, and the burden of proof lies with the party asserting
abandonment.37 9
372. Id. Village Law requires public use for ten years. VILLAGE LAw § 6-626.
The Highway Law, applicable to towns, requires public use for twenty years.
HIGHWAY LAw § 189.
373. People v. Underhill, 39 N.E. 333, 335-36 (N.Y. 1895).
374. Spier v. Town of Utrecht, 24 N.E. 692, 694 (N.Y. 1890). There is doubt-
ful authority for the proposition that if the use is hostile, then adoption by the
local government is unnecessary to make the road public. Village of Wellsville
v. Hallock, 139 N.Y.S. 961 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
375. N.Y. HIGH. LAw § 205 (McKinney 1979).
376. Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 112 N.E. 926, 929 (N.Y. 1916).
377. Town of Leray v. New York Cent. R.R., 123 N.E. 145 (N.Y. 1919); Man-
gam v. Village of Sing Sing, 50 N.Y.S. 647 (1898), affd 58 N.E. 1089 (N.Y.
1900). A court may find abandonment, however, where the road is overgrown
and the use is sporadic and does not follow a clear trail. Hallenbeck v. State,
299 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
378. Barnes, 112 N.E. at 928. See also Town of Leray, 123 N.E. at 145
(where road was closed to public use by the railroad's construction of a
terminal).
379. Hallenbeck, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
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4. Private Easements and Farm Crossings
Where the railroad acquires a right-of-way that divides
private property under single ownership, the railroad is
obliged to provide a crossing to join the divided estate.38 0
Although such crossings are termed "farm crossings" in the
statute, the courts have held that the statutory duty applies
to any use by the owner of the divided estate.38 1 Once the
portion of the estate which used the farm crossing is sold, the
obligation to provide a farm crossing ceases.
38 2
Where the language in the conveyance suggests an ease-
ment was retained by the grantor, the court will recognize
the easement.383 Unlike a farm crossing, a private easement
continues to serve the dominant estate regardless of common
ownership, and consequently, may serve a residential
subdivision.38 4
The conversion of a private railroad crossing to a public
crossing (after 1897) requires the consent of the DOT.38 5 The
private or public status of the crossing does not control public
use of the crossing.38 6 There are several principles that sup-
port the right of the public to use a private crossing,38 7 at
least where the crossing directly serves public trust lands
and waters.
380. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 52 (McKinney 1991).
381. Syracuse Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. New York, 350 N.Y.S.2d 474 (App.
Div., 4th Dep't 1973).
382. Smith v. New York Cent. R.R., 257 N.Y.S. 313 (App. Div., 4th Dep't
1932) (holding that "farm crossing" rights are extinguished when title to the
properties served by the crossing are severed, thus preventing the use of a farm
crossing for the purposes of a residential subdivision).
383. Neuhaus v. Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y.S.2d 930 (App. Div., 2d Dep't
1968) (holding that language of conveyance reserving a "road or a farm cross-
ing" sufficient to create an easement).
384. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 488 cmt. b (1944).
385. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
386. The property served by the easement could be a business, in which case
the public could use the crossing as invitees.
387. The issue considered here is the right of the public to use a private
crossing as against the railroad. If the crossing is part of a private road, the
owner of the road controls use of the crossing. Under the railroad law, it is
possible to have a public road where the crossing is private.
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Since the railroad has the paramount right-of-way at
grade crossings, an increase in the burden to the railroad
from public use of a private crossing is nominal.38 8 The legis-
lation defining a private crossing also recognizes that the
public may actually use the private crossing.38 9 Although the
railroad is protected in its reasonable use of its tracks, includ-
ing its paramount right-of-way at the crossing, the railroad
may not enjoin the reasonable use of a crossing within the
expectations of the parties at the time the easement was cre-
ated, or as shown by the subsequent use of the crossing.3 90
Where a crossing provides direct access to public trust lands
and waters, public use of the crossing is a reasonable expecta-
tion of the parties.391
D. The Effect of Substantive Law on Public Access
There is an array of legal doctrines that protect public
access to the Hudson River, despite principles of railroad law
that limit public access to protect operations and public
safety.3 92 Some of these doctrines are explicit, 393 however,
388. The railroad could argue, however, that increased use of the crossing
burdens the railroad by increasing the likelihood of an accident for which the
railroad may be liable.
389. N.Y. R.R. LAw § 97 (McKinney 1991).
390. See Board of Education v. Nielsen, 195 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
391. This proposition is strongest where the crossing directly serves trust
lands. The state's policy against the creation of new public crossings appears
adverse to the public use of private grade crossings. Through public dedication
of a private road, a crossing can become public in fact, except in the technical
sense under the railroad law. The only recourse the state has, however, is clo-
sure of the crossing. See N.Y. R.R. LAW § 93-a (McKinney 1991) (decision to
remove grade crossing must include a determination that removal is in the pub-
lic interest).
392. Limiting public access to increase train speed is extrinsic to the public
right to obtain access. See supra parts II.B.-D. and III.B.6. While the state has
police power control over public safety, to the extent it is merely standing in the
shoes of the railroad and closing crossings to improve operations at the least
cost, the state is not acting in its police power capacity, but as a surrogate rail-
road which is unauthorized to eliminate public access. While place and manner
restrictions on access are fully justified, see supra part III.C.4, these are prop-
erly micro adjustments and not prohibitions on accessing miles of shoreline in
favor of one public park.
If state actions crossed an undefined threshold in limiting access (the
courts have never attempted to define the exact extent to which the state may
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the applicability of trust doctrine to public access in view of
railroad grants and certain private grants has not been
determined.
Grants to upland owners generally do not reserve a pub-
lic interest by implication.394 Grants to the railroads have
not been judicially construed in this regard. While railroad
lands do not cut off private rights to access the Hudson
River,3 95 public rights to access to the river across railroad
lands have not been litigated. There is every reason to con-
clude that the public has a right to access public waters equal
to that of upland owners. 396
Whether railroad grants are defeasible estates has not
been tested.3 97 Despite the unsettled law, applicable statutes
and case law strongly suggest that the courts should find that
the railroad takes no more than an easement to public trust
abdicate its trust, see supra part III.A.3.c.iii), it is possible that a public trust
argument could be employed successfully, at least in the defense of a particular
crossing, especially in view of the state's failure to formulate a comprehensive
access plan despite the extensive closures that have adversely affected public
access. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. Insofar as public safety is
the issue, safety is protected equally by limiting rail traffic and speed as by
limiting public access.
393. See supra parts IH.B.1, III.C.2.
394. The Court of Appeals has held that commercial or beneficial enjoyment
grants convey unrestricted fee, subject to state and federal regulation of naviga-
tion. Some grants contain a condition subsequent, however, limiting the use to
commercial purposes and docks. See supra part IU.A.3.c.ii. Railroad grants,
however, do not contain either beneficial enjoyment or commercial purposes
language. The grants convey under a recital of the applicable railroad law,
which permit grants for the purposes of the road. See supra part III.A.3.b.ii.
395. See supra part III.C.1.
396. The right of public access to trust waters is an essential element of the
public's right to use trust waters. See supra part III.A.1. Points of access,
where a public street runs along or terminates on the river, are not cut off by
the filling of adjacent submerged lands. See supra part III.C.2. Furthermore,
the railroad's statutory duty to extend docks and wharves impaired by the rail-
road implicitly requires the preservation of access to such places. See supra
note 277 and accompanying text.
397. Although abandonment may be a fact sensitive question, when the rail-
road sells formerly granted lands, abandonment is conclusive. The state has
not attempted to assert control of abandoned lands and there are procedural
obstacles to alternate private actions challenging the validity of a grant. See
supra part III.A.C.3.i. See also infra note 410 (concerning the public's ability to
force the state to bring an action).
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lands for the purpose and time necessary for its operations.
Several principles support such a rule.
The general rule of construction is that nothing is taken
from the sovereign by implication. 398 This rule has added
stature where the sovereign grants a specific use for lands
held in trust for the public. The Board has no power to alien-
ate trust lands, except as authorized by law: and the applica-
ble statute allows the Board only to grant lands to railroads
"for the purposes of their road."399
The courts have held that such conveyances impart a
limited fee for the purposes of the road.400 This fee does not
carry riparian rights, nor does it permit the railroad to block
access to the Hudson River.40 1 In addition, the legislature is
powerless to grant fee simple absolute to approximately one
hundred miles of the Hudson River shore under Coxe, Long
Sault, and Marba Sea Bay.40 2
In sum, the fee is held for a reasonable and specific rail-
road use subject to the public interest in navigable waters.
Therefore, the fee should be construed as no more than an
easement subject to a condition subsequent. 40 3 The reason-
ing is not limited to the right-of-way, but should apply to rail-
road stations, depots, or yards built upon formally submerged
lands. Such improvements may warrant greater restrictions
on public rights of access when in use. Upon abandonment,
398. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 10 (1894); People v. New York and Staten
Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 77 (1877); Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 18 (N.Y.
1829).
399. Act of Apr. 2, 1850, ch. 140, § 25, 1850 N.Y. Laws 223 (current version
at N.Y. R.R. LAW § 18 (McKinney 1991)).
400. See e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Aldridge, 32 N.E. 50,
54 (N.Y. 1892).
401. See supra parts IH.C.1. (Riparian Rights); III.C.2. (Adjoining Public
Highways); III.B.1. (Statutory Protection of Access).
402. See supra part III.A.3.c.iii.
403. The effect of abandonment on the railroad's title normally depends upon
whether the railroad took the lands by eminent domain or purchase. See supra
part III.B.4. Railroad grants are taken neither by purchase nor eminent do-
main. The effect of abandonment on trust lands is a question of first impression
in New York. In Vermont, however, the state supreme court has held that
grants of trust lands to railroads contain a condition subsequent and that the
state has the power of re-entry upon abandonment. State v. Central Vt. Ry.,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Vt. 1989).
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however, the limited purpose for which they were carved out
of public trust lands should not create a residual private
property interest superior to the paramount interests of the
people and the sovereign power of the state.
Public use of idle railroad lands to access the river also is
consistent with the principle that the railroad only takes
trust lands as an easement. 40 4 The only question, therefore,
is whether public use unreasonably interferes with railroad
operations, viewed at the time the easement was granted.40 5
Although the state might prohibit such use, and the neces-
sary crossing of the right-of-way, it has not done So.
4 0 6
The grant of trust lands to the upland owner also ad-
versely affects public access to the river.40 7 There is a pre-
sumption against the right of the public to use lands granted
to the upland owner.408 Where grants contain a condition
404. Without clear abandonment, the state is unlikely to seek annulment of
grants made to the railroad. The state is actively seeking to expand passenger
service on the eastern shore. See supra part ll.B. In addition, the courts tend
to protect the property interests of grantees who improved submerged lands in
reliance on their grants. See, e.g., Williams v. Mayor of New York, 11 N.E. 829
(N.Y. 1887). Nonetheless, because the magnitude of the railroad grants was so
great, the courts may avoid the issue of validity by construing the grants as
reserving public interests that do not unreasonably interfere with the operation
of the railroad. See e.g., Marba Sea Bay, 5 N.E.2d 824, 829 (O'Brien, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that although a grant conveyed trust lands to the low water mark,
the grant conveyed no more than a fee subject to public use under the trust
doctrine).
405. See supra notes 389-91 and accompanying text.
406. The statutory prohibition on public use of the railroad right-of-way does
not prohibit the public from crossing the tracks. See supra note 349.
407. The New York Court of Appeals has validated the piecemeal privatiza-
tion of trust lands while espousing general principles inconsistent with such
privatization. See e.g., supra notes 237-47 and accompanying text. The contra-
diction, and unwillingness to unequivocally approve the power of the state to
absolutely alienate trust lands, see supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text,
illustrates judicial restraint and an appreciation of separation of powers. None-
theless, the reluctance of the court to approve conveyances that serve no public
purpose, and indeed injure the public, serves as a warning that the legislative
and executive branches must not go too far.
408. See supra part III.A.3.cii. In re Waterfront allowed some exceptions by
recognizing two cases which engrafted a public use on private grants because of
the factual circumstances. In re Waterfront, 157 N.E. 911, 916-17 (distinguish-
ing Thousand Island Steamboat Co., 71 N.E. at 764; Harper v. Williams, 18
N.E. 77 (N.Y. 1888)).
77
824 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
subsequent, however, the state may retain the power of re-
entry.40 9 There is a basis for public enforcement of the power
of re-entry regardless of state cooperation. 410
IV. Recommendations
A. Introduction
There are two primary areas of concern that affect access
to the Hudson River. First, the privatization of the shore is
inimical to access. In this area there are two related issues
which require determination. One, the railroad's title to ex-
cess lands and its ability to convey excess lands to private
parties is an issue. The second issue is whether the state has
any remaining interest in previously submerged shore par-
cels granted by the state to the adjacent upland owners.
The second area of concern is the closure of crossings.
This area also raises two related issues. First, the impetus
for crossing closures, safety and high-speed rail proposals,
should not be accepted without question. Second, the present
methods employed by the state to close crossings also war-
rant critical inquiry. The public should require the state to
provide a coherent Hudson River access plan, in view of pres-
ent and anticipated use requirements.
Each of these issues shall be developed below. Some of
these recommendations call for a clarification, or a develop-
ment, of existing law. Law is not immutable, but serves pub-
lic policy. The health of the river was ignored for centuries.
Over the past thirty years, the degradation of the river be-
came contrary to public policy and laws designed to protect
the river developed. Likewise, as the health of the river is
restored, and with it meaningful recreational use and com-
mercial fishing, the policy which ignored public access should
change, and with this change in policy, the development of
409. The power is restricted by the statute of limitations. See supra part
III.A.3.c.i. The statute permits adverse possession against the sovereign. The
permission is not constitutionally required, but is only a matter of policy.
410. The statute requires the Attorney General to bring an action to void a
grant for failing to fulfill a condition subsequent. A member of the public
should be able to compel the state to bring the action because the duty is
mandatory. See supra part III.A.3.c.i.
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law designed to protect access is required. Accordingly, legal
principles concerning access will need refinement, and in
some instances, reconsideration, in view of the needs of today
and tomorrow.
B. Privatization of the Hudson River Shoreline
1. Grants to the Railroads
The railroads, as they appear today, are the result of a
long history. Stations have opened and closed, the right-of-
ways have been realigned and widened, additional tracks
have been laid and some tracks have been abandoned. Partly
as a result of these changes, 411 the railroads have come to
own excess lands, many of which were formerly submerged
lands.412 The extent to which these lands are truly excess
can be debated in any particular case. Nonetheless, the rail-
roads, throughout their history, have sold excess lands for
profit.413 Where these sales created private property, the
public has, in certain situations, been cut off from the river.
The state legislature and the courts have distinguished
the rights of the railroads to sell excess lands depending upon
the use made of the land (for a right-of-way or a station) and
the form of acquisition (by purchase or condemnation). 414
These limitations and rights do not apply, however, to for-
merly submerged lands. Such lands were acquired by grant
(neither through purchase nor condemnation), although nom-
inal sums may have been paid.415 The state, through legisla-
tion or litigation, has never attempted to define the railroads'
411. The railroads have also purchased lands which were never necessary
for their use as railroads. The purchases with which the author is familiar may
have been negotiated with grantors of additional rights-of-way where the re-
maining shore lands were not wanted by the grantors.
412. See, e.g., PACE REPORT, supra note 7, at B-11.
413. See, e.g., id. The railroad title maps of 1917 indicate many sales of rail-
road lands (the maps were updated sporadically with title information until the
1960s).
414. See supra part III.B.5. (Abandonment of Railroad Lands).
415. See supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text (e.g., $500 compensation
paid by the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad for the entire right-
of-way and stations built upon submerged lands along the eastern shore of the
river).
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right to sell those lands.416 The state has routinely acqui-
esced, however, to the sale of such lands by granting to the
railroads' grantees any residual interest the state may have
in the lands.417
The legislature should require a right of first refusal, for
a nominal sum, in favor of the state for all railroad sales of
formerly submerged lands. The state should be obliged to ex-
ercise the right unless it finds that the lands in question can-
not serve a public use related to the Hudson River. The
findings should be made only after public notice and comment
with a final determination not to purchase subject to judicial
review.418
In addition, the state should be authorized to re-enter
and take title to idle lands conveyed by grant to the rail-
road.4 19 The public should be permitted to petition the state
to re-enter railroad lands and to obtain judicial review if the
state refuses to take action.420 In any action by the state to
quiet title, a summary proceeding should be provided to
lessen the state's burden of proof. The state should prevail
upon proof that the formerly submerged lands were granted
by the state. The railroads must carry the burden to prove
that the lands are still required for railroad purposes.
416. Some grants, however, contain an express reservation on the part of the
state to revoke the grant. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
417. The state may grant all its remaining interest in previously granted
lands without public notice. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
418. This procedure would halt the sale of excess railroad lands to private
parties unless there are exceptional circumstances. The procedure merely en-
sures that the state is aware that its power of re-entry has matured, see supra
notes 221-25 and 274, and accompanying text, which serves to protect trust
interests as well as the title of railroad grantees. Finally, judicial review of a
state decision not to purchase merely provides an alternate to an action to com-
pel the state's power of re-entry. See supra text accompanying note 224.
419. Where the right of first refusal will halt the sale of railroad lands, it will
also deter the railroad from attempting the sale of excess lands. A right of re-
entry asserts the state's continuing interest in trust lands granted to the rail-
road and provides a mandate for the state to assert title. The codification of the
procedure is consistent with a long line of judicial cases construing the rail-
road's fee in submerged lands. See generally part III.D.
420. To deter frivolous litigation, the petitioner could have the obligation of
presenting a prima facie case that the idle lands have not been used for railroad
purposes for five years.
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This proposed legislation clearly asserts the state's con-
trol over formerly granted lands which are not used for rail-
road purposes. Such legislation, however, should not be
viewed as creating a new property interest in the state, but
rather as providing a procedure for discharging an existing
obligation under public trust doctrine. This obligation should
be recognized by the courts if the legislature fails to act.421
2. Grants to Upland Owners
While the proposed legislation concerning railroad
grants does not directly conflict with existing law, any rever-
sionary interest in the state for grants to upland owners may
conflict with private property interests which have been rec-
ognized for too long to permit their loss without effecting a
constitutional taking.422 Nonetheless, the state has at least
two options to mitigate the harm caused by granting trust
lands without effecting a reversal of judicial precedent, how-
ever questionable that precedent may be. 423
Although law in New York concerning the state's re-
served interests in grants of trust lands is complex, the law is
reasonably clear that the state may convey title without any
reservations under certain circumstances. 424 This rule con-
flicts with trust doctrine because it permits the interference
with public rights merely to confer a private benefit to an up-
421. The danger of the state asserting a "new" property interest is that the
state's action may give rise to a takings claim under the state or federal consti-
tution. See supra part III.A.2.c.v. The proposed legislation, however, is consis-
tent with principles of public trust doctrine and railroad law.
422. Grants to the upland owner generally convey absolute fee unles_ they
contain a condition subsequent or an explicit reservation See supra part
III.A.3.c.ii.
423. For a discussion of the cases which concern extinguishment of the pub-
lic trust, see supra notes 162-70 (Appleby), 236-51 (Steeplechase), and 228-31 (In
re Water Front).
424. For example, grants of trust lands for unrestricted "beneficial enjoy-
ment," for consideration, and where the lands are appropriated by the grantee,
are held in fee simple absolute, provided the grant is not of such magnitude as
to be void as an impermissible alienation of the public trust. See supra part
III.A.3.c.ii. One United States Supreme Court decision, however, holds that ap-
propriation of the submerged lands is not essential to vesting absolute title,
where compensation is paid. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
For a criticism of Appleby, see supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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land owner.425 The state serves no.public interest by abdicat-
ing its sovereign duty as trustee. Consequently, the state
should be prohibited from conveying absolute grants of trust
lands and from conveying any remaining interest it may have
in lands previously granted.426
In addition to a prohibition on absolute grants, the state
should assert a retained interest in grants subject to the con-
dition subsequent that the lands may only be used for the
purposes of erecting docks and commerce. 427 Public use of
commercial grants should be encouraged where feasible. 428
Where granted trust lands have become so polluted that they
425. The case which stated the rule attempted to reconcile the interference
with trust doctrine: "During all our history the Legislature and the courts have
recognized that the public interest may require or at least justify a limited re-
striction of the boundaries of navigable waters." People v. Steeplechase Park
Co., 113 N.E. 521, 526 (N.Y. 1916). No justification in the public interest, how-
ever, was offered in the case and none seriously can be argued now. Only three
of the seven judges concurred in the opinion, thus the court was unable to agree
on a rationale for the rule. See supra notes 418-26 and accompanying text.
426. Limited absolute conveyances were permitted, in part, to bring what
were considered waste lands (wetlands) into productivity. The policy was based
upon ignorance and the law that advanced the policy is no longer appropriate.
See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (stating that newly recog-
nized scientific and ecological values of wetlands are not subordinate to "outmo-
ded" use preferences). A major doctrinal problem under the present
jurisprudence is that the state may incrementally achieve what it is prohibited
from doing with a single grant, that is, the privatization of miles of waterfront.
See supra part III.A.3.c.iii. The logical inconsistency is solved by prohibiting
absolute alienation.
427. Commercial grants between 1835 and circa 1890 probably contain a
condition subsequent restricting use to docks and commercial use, see supra
notes 227-32 and accompanying text; consequently, the state retains the power
of re-entry.
428. The assertion of a public right to use some privately held trust lands
would open new opportunities for public access, and help facilitate a system for
public trails along the river. New York has not recognized the absolute right to
exclude the public from formerly submerged lands (under lesser grants than for
unrestricted beneficial enjoyment). See supra note 410 and accompanying text.
Public use may be, therefore, a fact sensitive legal question. To avoid uncer-
tain, case by case litigation, a legislative declaration would create a presump-
tion in favor of public access to lands granted for commercial purposes. The
owner of such lands would then have the burden of showing that public access
is incompatible with the adapted use. Such a burden could be met by proof, for
example, that the property is adopted to private residences. However, where
the trust lands have become derelict industrial sites, or abandoned wharves,
then a right of public access should prevail. Such legislation would alter the
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pose a danger to remaining trust lands and waters, the state
should revoke the grant.429
C. Closure of Crossings
1. High-Speed Rail
Under Governor Cuomo, New York State formalized a
long-standing plan to create a high-speed inter-city rail sys-
tem along the Hudson River. The premise for the plan is that
the state should encourage the best transportation at the
least cost. The premise appeals to common sense, but the
costs are more difficult to quantify than the state proposal
acknowledges.
The construction of the railroad on the shores of the river
during the last century also provided, in theory, the best
transportation for the least cost. Along the Hudson was a
great supply of public lands, dramatically reducing the rail-
road's cost of land acquisition for the right-of-way. In addi-
tion, the river offered a grade superior to any inland route.
This least cost route, however, has bound the shores in rip
rap and iron and created the access problem that is the sub-
ject of this article.
Further development of the railroad infrastructure to
support high-speed rail will exacerbate the problems associ-
ated with the railroads. 48 0 The removal of grade crossings
(without alternate access provided for the informal crossings
not recognized by the DOT), fencing the right-of-way, in-
creased rail traffic (and consequent increase in noise) will all
serve to solidify the barrier to the river by enlarging a loud,
dangerous, 43 1 and unsightly presence on the river. Because
law by turning the limited exception recognized in In re Waterfront into a lim-
ited presumption in favor of public access. Id.
429. A sufficient showing for revocation could be found where the site is sub-
ject to enforcement actions under federal and state environmental laws. There
are numerous abandoned industrial sites built on public trust lands that pose a
hazard to the river. See e.g., Editorial, Havoc-on-Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1995, at A20 (describing a contaminated thirty-two acre industrial site in Has-
tings-on-Hudson). The application of trust lands to uses that injure remaining
trust waters arguably violates the condition subsequent where it applies.
430. See supra part II.C.
431. See supra part III.B.6. (Tort Liability and Public Safety).
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this process is "incremental," the state has refused to con-
sider these adverse effects, alternate routes or taking no ac-
tion in an appropriate EIS process. 432
The state should not assume that high-speed rail is good
for New York without consideration of its adverse impacts,
nor for the river communities which will receive little benefit
from high-speed rail service, and yet will bear most of the
burdens associated with the service. The decision should be
reconsidered, the feasibility of alternate routes and services
should be analyzed, and the adverse effects of high-speed rail
should be carefully weighed with the purported benefits of
such service along the Hudson River line.
In short, the state should undertake its responsibility to
carefully study the high-speed rail proposal through the ap-
propriate EIS process in which the public has an opportunity
to comment.433 The DOT should stop making "improve-
ments" for railroad operations until the state formulates a
transportation plan that is consistent with a plan for public
access to the Hudson River.
2. Comprehensive Planning
Grade crossings are closed under a case by case process.
Although there is public notice, 434 the closure is typically ne-
gotiated between the DOT and the affected local commu-
nity.435 As a consequence, there is no statewide planning as
part of the process.43 6
The decision of the DOT, supported by the State Depart-
ment and DEC, not to develop a general access plan through
432. See supra part II.D
433.
434. See supra part II.C.2.a.
435. See, e.g., PACE REPORT, supra note 7, at B-35 to B-36 (closure proceeding
in Cornwall-on-Hudson).
436. The input of the Greenway Council provides, to some extent, oversight
of closures from the broader perspective of public access to the river as a whole.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text. Participation by the Greenway,
however, has been insufficient to promote general public participation, largely
because Greenway has conceded that closures should be accorded a case by case
treatment.
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an EIS process,43 7 facilitates closures in two ways. First, a
decision concerning a grade crossing elimination is made by
the DOT and a local community. The DOT is in a strong posi-
tion to negotiate, because of its jurisdictional power and con-
trol over funds which it can make available to a community to
improve or create public amenities. Second, the one on one
negotiations fostered by the DOT exclude input from the pub-
lic at large on the broader issue of access generally. Whereas
local communities may view waterfront development as a po-
tential source of tourist revenue, they frequently are not in-
terested in providing an access point for the general public.
438
The Hudson River is a public resource and a comprehen-
sive plan to provide access is a public concern. The means
adopted by the state government concerning the elimination
of public access have precluded general public participation.
This position by the state is strengthened by the interests of
local communities, who might be appalled by the idea that
outsiders should have a voice in the decision-making of "local"
access questions. 439
The problem is one of priority. The present system facili-
tates closures. 440 The priority, however, should not be clo-
sures, but enhancement of public access. The state should
place a moratorium upon closures until it creates a river wide
plan for public access. Part of the plan should consist of a
thorough inventory of existing and potential crossings, and
an inventory of public crossings that have been closed ille-
gally (without formal proceedings).
437. See supra part II.B.3.c.iii.
438. For example, many communities limit outside use of a public boat
ramps and waterfront parks by prohibiting parking without a local permit.
439. Regulations under the Coastal Law require state agency consideration
of access for "all the public." See supra note 74.
440. The mandate to close crossings applies to railroads generally. See supra
part M.B.2. The mandate to improve and protect access is both independent of
railroad law, see supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (describing coastal
policy) and a part of railroad law. See supra part III.B.1. An executive decision
to subordinate public access to railroad operations, without formal analysis or
consideration, see supra part II.D., is an arbitrary and capricious election in
contravention of relevant statutory and case law.
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The DOT may be institutionally unable to prioritize pub-
lic access over its primary mission, the safe improvement of
the transportation infrastructure.441 The presence of grade
crossings, especially informal pedestrian crossings, is an ob-
stacle to the DOT mission. The study, therefore, should not
be conducted by the DOT, but by the State Department of
New York, which the legislature has charged with the duty of
protecting and enhancing coastal resources and access to the
same.442 By placing the jurisdiction over crossings and fenc-
ing that implicate coastal access in the hands of the Secretary
of State, the DOT will be relieved of an inherent conflict be-
tween access and transportation improvements. At the same
time, access to the Hudson River, will be given priority over
transportation improvements. The structural reordering of
these priorities is essential to the preservation and enhance-
ment of access to the Hudson River.
V. Conclusion
An appreciation for the Hudson River is where efforts for
improved access must begin. The pollution the river has suf-
fered has unquestionably tainted public perception. Underly-
ing the recommendations of this report is a view of what the
river may become again: a resource that may be used for
swimming and fishing without apprehension, a place where
441. In certain instances, the DOT has done an excellent job to improve pub-
lic use of the Hudson River. The DOT activities concerning Castleton Island
State Park and the Village of Castleton-on-Hudson provide an excellent exam-
ple. See PACE REPORT, supra note 7, at B-3 to B-5. Nonetheless, the DOT is
seeking to concentrate public use of the river by restricting access points to
discrete parks and public facilities served by grade-separated structures. As a
consequence, the DOT has a strong incentive not to raise the question of public
access to an old wharf or spit of undeveloped land, used by the public despite a
lack of improved access. Access is an obstacle for the DOT, it has no incentive
to multiply the crossings that it must face. It is unreasonable to expect the
DOT, faced with the task of eliminating grade crossings, to multiply its work,
and the cost of accomplishing its work, by seeking out new crossing opportuni-
ties, identifying illegal closures, and by formally recognizing existing informal
crossings.
442. Under the Coastal Law, any state action that affects public access to the
Hudson River is subject to approval by the Secretary of State, thus it should be
the lead agency in the preparation of an EIS. See supra part II.D. (summariz-
ing New York State coastal management law).
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birdwatchers may enjoy a flock of mergansers without the
nagging concern that the ducks' fatty tissues are contami-
nated by PCBs. These fears and concerns subtly influence
the public. A walk in the mountains may be preferred to a
canoe trip or a walk along the river, without full awareness
that the preference is influenced by an aversion to the river's
pollution. This subtle influence is a contaminant, precisely of
the same nature as the contaminants that have been allowed
to pollute the river. In this frame of mind, a permanent loss
of access becomes secondary to the running of a faster train.
Improving public access turns the public's face to the
river and provides a plan to enjoy the river for what it offers
today and tomorrow. Ready access to quiet spots where one
can picnic, swim, fish, or launch a kayak, are precious to the
quality of life. The alternative, highly controlled access to
limited public parks, creates a gauntlet of highways, user
permits, parking lots, weekend crowds, and lines to the
snackbar. Large public parks can provide excellent ameni-
ties, and can serve to protect fragile ecosystems, however,
these functions are maximized where they do not provide the
only access.
The concern for public access is not new. The protection
of access is embodied in the public trust doctrine, a tradition
of law reaching into antiquity. The right to use a healthy
river is implicit in the trust doctrine, and measures that deny
public use, whether through the removal of access or through
the pollution of the river, are highly suspect under estab-
lished principles of law. Although some of the proposed rec-
ommendations for improving public access call for a
modification of the law, the changes are designed to protect
traditional public rights that changing conditions have
eroded.
By subordinating the interests of the railroads to the
public's right of access, and by limiting the power of the state
to alienate its responsibilities under the public trust, the judi-
ciary has affirmed a doctrinal basis upon which the public can
assert a right of meaningful access to the Hudson River.
While the judiciary has prohibited the substantial alienation
of the Hudson's shore, the state's executive and legislature
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have been allowing or aiding this very result. Such govern-
mental abdication and complicity are illegitimate. The cur-
rent administration, under Governor Pataki, has the
opportunity to reverse this tendency. The legislature and ex-
ecutive have the opportunity to build upon the doctrinal basis
and assert what is both a sovereign duty and a sovereign
power: the public trust interests of the people of the State of
New York through the protection and enhancement of public
access to the Hudson River.
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